P 12 radar station. Farewell to Lena. Purpose and features

10.03.2020

Years in the special design bureau SKB-197 (later JSC "FNPC "" - NNIIRT) under the leadership of the chief designer E. V. Bukvalov. The station was put into service in the year and was mass-produced by JSC "Nizhny Novgorod Television Plant named after. V. I. Lenin" - OAO "NITEL". With a pulse power of 180 kW, the P-12 radar ensured the detection of aircraft at a distance of about 200 km, flying in an altitude range of up to 25 km.

The P-18 was created on the basis of the P-12MP radar by transferring its equipment to a new element base. At the same time, the radar was paired with the new radar system for identifying the nationality of Kremniy-2M aircraft, which had been created by that time. After successful tests, the new P-18 radar was adopted by the Soviet Army in the year.

Purpose and features

Purpose

The P-18 radar is designed for timely detection and tracking of air objects, including those made using stealth technology, within the visibility zone, determining their nationality and issuing their coordinates (range, azimuth) to consumers of information about the air situation.

Peculiarities

Unlike the prototype (P-12 radar), the P-18 radar provides more accurate target designation ground facilities destruction of air targets, as well as guidance of fighter aircraft on enemy aircraft. In addition, this station has improved immunity to electronic interference. In 1979, a new interrogator was introduced into the P-18 radar set, located on a self-propelled separate vehicle base. High specifications, ease of use, reliability and high mobility led to the great popularity of the P-18 radar and the demand for it by the troops of Russia and abroad. All radar equipment is located on a self-propelled base of two vehicles, one of which houses electronic equipment with operators' workplaces, on the second - an antenna-mast device (AMU). For autonomous power supply, two AD-10 units placed in trailers are used.

The main characteristics of the P-18 radar

MiG-21 detection range (in interference): at an altitude of 500 m - up to 60 (40) km at an altitude of 10,000 m - Up to 180 (90) km at an altitude of 20,000-27,000 m - up to 260 (170) km
Accuracy of determination of coordinates: in range - 1400 m in azimuth - 47 arc. min.
Active noise suppression coefficient - n / a passive interference - 20 dB
Deployment time - 45 min.
Power consumption - 10 kW
Calculation - 4 people.
Mean time between failures - 140 hours.

Links

Soviet and Russian radar stations
general purpose	P-3 P-8 Volga P-10 Volga-A P-14 P-18 "Terek" P-20 P-30 P-35 P-37 P-40 P-70 Oborona-14) Sunflower-E 1 Resonance-N (E) Casta-2E Gamma-DE Gamma-S1E Opponent-GE ST-68 CAR radar "Ring"
Special SAM radars	P-15 P-19 1L117M Desna-M 76N6 96L6E
Long range radar stations	Dnepr Dnestr-M Daryal Krona Danube Don-2N Duga 1 Volga Voronezh-M/DM
Aviation radars	RP-5 Emerald-5 Liana Vega-M Bumblebee E-801 Eye N007 Barrier N010 Zhuk ( 8-II / 27 / M(S)(E) / (M)F(E) / A(E)) H011 Bars ( M/29) H035 Irbis H050
Shipborne radars	Frigate) Furke-2 Monument-A Pal-N
Counter-battery and other radars	Zoo Stork Farah
1 - over-the-horizon detection stations

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See what the "Radar station P-18" is in other dictionaries:

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Radar "Radar" redirects here; about register ... Wikipedia

Books

, Garin E.N. , The textbook outlines general information about the P-18R radar, its structure, the principles of operation of individual systems and units. Particular attention is paid to the description of the physical meaning of the processes occurring during… Category: Textbooks for universities Publisher: INFRA-M, Manufacturer: INFRA-M,
Military technical training. Air Force RTV radar device. Radar station P-18R. Textbook. In 2 parts. Part 1 ,

On the night of December 26-27, 1969, during an acrobatic operation behind enemy lines, Israeli paratroopers stole a Russian P-12 radar and transported it by helicopter to Israel.

After Israel's victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, a lull settled in the Middle East. The total defeat of the armies of the Arab countries, which he supported and armed Soviet Union, deprived the Arabs of huge arsenals of Russian weapons - the Israelis destroyed or captured more than four thousand Russian tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery barrels and other heavy weapons. The losses of the air forces of the Arab countries amounted to more than 400 Russian-made combat aircraft.

However, the total defeat of the Arab allies did not stop the leadership of the USSR. Soon after the Six-Day War, the USSR signed a secret agreement with the Arabs, under which it undertook to fully restore the military potential of the defeated armies of the Arab countries. And again, Russian weapons flowed to the Arabs, the volume of deliveries reached almost 10 billion dollars.

Today it is difficult to understand what the Soviet leadership was guided by, endowing such unreliable allies as the Arabs with weapons, which was soon joined by tens of thousands of Russian troops sent to war against Israel in the ranks of the Arab armies. (Soviet assistance to the Arabs turned out to be "not a horse's fodder" - already in 1972, Egypt broke off allied relations with the USSR and expelled tens of thousands of Russian military personnel in an extremely humiliating form.)

In 1968, having restored their military potential with the help of the USSR, the Arabs launched military operations against Israel along the entire line of separation of Arab and Israeli troops. The Arabs were aware of their unpreparedness for a full-scale war against Israel and therefore used the tactics of air raids, artillery shelling and sabotage operations, hoping, thus, to wear down the Israeli troops. The calculation was based on the limited economic and human resources of Israel, whose population then barely exceeded two million people. Therefore, the fighting in the zone of the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights, which lasted about two years, was called the "War of Attrition".

Israel has accepted the gauntlet thrown down. Israeli troops, having seized complete air supremacy, began massive air raids on the military, industrial, and energy centers of the Arabs. In the deep rear of the enemy, units of the Israeli paratroopers operated. (In the end, the Arabs were again defeated in the War of Attrition, and again the USSR saved them from disaster).

During the War of Attrition, Israeli pilots discovered that the enemy had some kind of new radar station (RLS), which made it possible to detect aircraft at low altitudes and at a greater range. I must say that during the Six-Day War, the Russian P-10 (Volga A) and P-35 (Saturn) radars were in the hands of the Israelis as trophies. Israeli specialists studied them in detail and developed electronic warfare equipment that allowed aircraft to easily overcome enemy air defense systems.

However, the mysterious new radar, apparently, had significantly better characteristics, and posed a serious threat to the actions of Israeli aircraft. Soon, Israeli intelligence became aware of the exact information about the new Russian radar - it was the P-12 Yenisei radar (target detection range - up to 250 km, detection height - up to 25 km).

Now it remained to find and destroy this so dangerous radar. According to intelligence data, the deployment site of the P-12 radar in the Ras Gharib region was revealed and on October 24, 1969, Israeli aircraft bombed. However, the allegedly bombed-out radar station continued its work. This means that the Israeli Air Force was misled and the strike was carried out on a skillfully substituted decoy.

The true location of the P-12 radar was discovered by accident - on December 22, 1969, an Israeli Air Force aircraft took aerial photographs of a suspicious object 5 kilometers from a false target. Two young interpreter officers from the air photography department of the Air Force Headquarters, studying the obtained images of the area at high magnification, suddenly discovered the station in a remote corner of the desert - on a hill scorched by the sun, on which stood two "Bedouin tents". There were no roads near this place and only a path led to it, along which the Bedouins drove herds of goats and sheep. No traces of air defense systems or security fortifications were found - but the well-camouflaged station, antenna, bunker and tent were clearly visible in the pictures.

Analyzing aerial photographs, the decoder officers came to the conclusion that the desire to completely disguise the radar played a cruel joke on the enemy - it was located isolated, without proper protection, there were no roads laid to it - all personnel movements were carried out covertly and only at night. The decryption officers had an idea - not just to destroy the radar, but to try to steal it and send it to Israel: knowing its characteristics, it was possible to hide the aircraft from enemy radars. The code-breaking officers presented their unexpected idea in a command report.

Already on December 24, the Chief of the General Staff of the Israeli Army, General Chaim Bar-Lev, held a meeting of senior officers of the ground forces and the Air Force. It turned out that there were no such operations in world military practice.

The closest analogue could only be called the operation of the British commandos during the 2nd World War, when in February 1942, the German Wurzburg radar was stolen near the French coast of the English Channel and transported to the UK by sea.

The meeting with the Chief of the General Staff came to the conclusion: The operation to capture the radar by a paratrooper unit and transport it by helicopter to Israel is extremely risky, but there are good chances of success.
The leadership and planning of the operation was entrusted to the commander of the paratroopers, General Rafael Eitan. General David Ivry, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force, was responsible for air support.

They planned a daring operation to capture the Russian radar and transport it to Israel, called Tarnegol (Petukh) -53 and more like a scenario for a military adventure blockbuster.

General Rafael Eitan enjoyed unquestioned authority among the paratroopers - he had dozens of operations deep behind enemy lines, he was distinguished by personal courage, severity and strict demands on his subordinates.

General Eitan was accustomed to operating behind enemy lines in a "hit and kill" style. This was exactly what was carried out shortly before that, on September 10, 1969, the landing operation "Raviv". In the course of it, an Israeli landing group was secretly transferred to the Egyptian coast of the Suez Canal on six captured Russian tanks T-54 and three BTR-50, which went through the rear of the enemy like a shaft of fire, leaving behind hundreds of corpses, destroyed positions of missile forces and artillery, radar , warehouses and military camps. Now it was necessary to act differently.

General Eitan knew each of his officers, from platoon commanders to commanders of paratrooper brigades. Therefore, to carry out such a responsible task, he chose the reconnaissance company of the 50th battalion of the 35th brigade of paratroopers. The commander of the 50th battalion was a combat officer, Lieutenant Colonel Arie Tsimmel (Tsidon). Zimmel came from a family of German Jews (Eki, as they are called in Israel), who are characterized by pedantry, punctuality and precision - qualities so necessary for the successful implementation of such a jewelry operation. Lieutenant Colonel Zimmel was entrusted with leading his soldiers into battle.

It took only one day to prepare the operation. On December 25, the training of paratroopers took place. The captured Russian P-10 radar, captured during the Six Day War, was used as a conditional object. In order to limit the number of people who knew about the impending operation, the paratroopers acted in a paratrooper way - they secretly entered the territory of the army warehouse, where the captured radar was stored and stole it under the nose of sentries. At their base, the paratroopers trained in capturing and dismantling the radar. They were given an officer, a specialist in radar, and master welders who, if necessary, were to cut the station with an autogenous.

It was more difficult for the pilots. It was decided to use three Super Frelon helicopters to deliver the landing, but there were problems with the delivery of the radar.

The P-12 radar was placed on a self-propelled base of two ZiL vehicles, one of which had electronic equipment with operator jobs, and the second had an antenna-mast device. For autonomous power supply, units placed in trailers were used. The total weight of all equipment exceeded 7 tons.

It was planned to use CH-35 helicopters as cargo helicopters, but according to the technical documentation, their carrying capacity did not exceed 3 tons. However, during training, Israeli pilots made sure that this helicopter can take up to 4 tons of payload.

Operation Tarnegol 53 began at 9:00 pm on December 26, 1969, with a massive bombardment by Israeli aircraft of Egyptian troops stationed in the area of the planned operation. This maneuver turned off the attention of the enemy from the radar.

Russian officer Igor Kulikov was at that moment at the location of the 504th battalion of the Egyptian army, the radio engineering company of which belonged to the ill-fated P-12 radar. He became an unwitting eyewitness to the unfolding events:
» An air raid began. The clock showed twenty-five past one.
- What do they report from the "radar"?
They are also being bombed.
We ourselves knew that the radio-technical company was being bombed, because we saw the red threads of anti-aircraft shell tracers - they were firing from a false radar battery.
The intensity of the air raid increased. At some moments it seemed that we simply would not make it until the morning. One of the bombs exploded between the battalion commander's dugout and the battalion's communication point. Somewhere at half past one in the night, the commander of the radio engineering company got in touch with us. He said that he sees a fire at the position of the radar. According to him, "the station itself, apparently, was destroyed by a bomb hit, since there is no connection with it." After that, the connection was interrupted.

In reality, the events around the radar developed as follows. Under the cover of an air raid, helicopters with Israeli paratroopers, remaining undetected by the enemy, landed at a given point.
Divided into three groups, the paratroopers moved to the location of the radar. One of the groups carried out military outposts and mined the path along which the paratroopers passed.

Soon the paratroopers reached the mountain on which the radar was located. Here they were helped by the noise of the station's generator running - because of it, the sentries did not hear the approaching fighters. The paratroopers took off the sentries, after which they attacked the tent, the bunker and the cars with the control room: the tent was pierced with automatic bursts and pelted with grenades, the paratroopers who burst into the bunker threw grenades at it. During the short-lived battle, up to 18 enemy soldiers and officers were destroyed.

Three officers were taken prisoner in the bunker, who turned out to be radar personnel useful for development. After a brief intensive interrogation, all three prisoners agreed to cooperate and provided a complete set of technical documentation. The prisoners were taken with them to Israel.

Having cleared the territory of the enemy, the paratroopers began to dismantle the radar.
There was a delay here - according to the plan, the dismantling was supposed to be completed at 01:45, but due to problems with the dismantling of the high antenna, the work was delayed until 02:43. Then the helicopters were called.

The first CH-53 helicopter landed at 02:55. The dismantled control rooms were attached to the external slings for helicopters and transported to Israel.
Before leaving, the paratroopers blew up everything that was on the territory of the radar station and, not forgetting to set booby traps, flew home by helicopter at 04:00.

Operation Tarnegol-53 was successfully completed without loss from the Israeli paratroopers.

At this time, panic and confusion reigned at the command post of the 504th battalion. Igor Kulikov writes:
“At half past five in the morning, one of the privates reported a strange sound. Running upstairs, we heard a very powerful and characteristic roar of helicopter engines. The first assumption: "The enemy, under the cover of aviation, intends to land troops!"
About thirty or forty minutes later the phone rang.
The Jews stole the radar! "

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HOW THE ISRAELIANS STOLEN RADAR FROM THE EGYPTIANS. FROM THE MEMORIES OF A MILITARY TRANSLATOR
NON-FIGURED HISTORY
Igor Kulikov
Magazine "Soldier of Fortune" No. 1 / 2000

This incredible event took place at the end of 1969 in Egypt, at the height of the so-called "war of attrition". On the night of December 26-27, on the Red Sea coast, a group of Israeli commandos managed to capture a Soviet-made Egyptian radar station and, using helicopters, transport it to the Sinai Peninsula. Thirty years later, the editors managed to find one of the direct witnesses to this extraordinary incident ...

For me, a student of the Military Institute of Foreign Languages, sent to Egypt as a military translator, this Arab-Israeli war began on November 30, 1969. On that day, early in the morning, together with Major Taras Panchenko, an adviser from the 3rd Mechanized Division, we left Cairo for the front. Our path lay in the distant, as it seemed, romantic Red Sea Military District * [* - in the Egyptian Armed Forces, the territory was also divided into districts]. Like the Suez Canal, it was also considered a war zone, although less active.

Zaafaran. Gulf of Suez. First day at the front. November 30, 1969
By evening, having covered almost 300 km, we safely reached the location of the 19th separate infantry brigade, stationed on the coast of the Gulf of Suez. With its defensive positions, it blocked the wide Zaafaran valley, which stretched deep into the Arabian Desert almost to the Nile.
In September - early October, the brigade was severely bombed. During one of the raids, our adviser was killed. Now it was relatively calm here. The tragic events of those days were only reminded by the skeletons of burnt equipment and huge craters from thousand-pound Israeli bombs. This remote area, like the entire coast of the Red Sea, was not covered by Egyptian air defense, and the Israeli pilots felt very confident here, as at a training ground.
Examining half a meter long and finger-thick saber-shaped fragments from bombs, I realized that I probably wouldn’t have to swim, sunbathe and break corals for souvenirs. Quiet life in Cairo with all the exoticism of a large eastern city somehow immediately remained in the past, and the immediate prospects for our new life no longer seemed so rosy.

504th BATTALION

It turned out at the brigade headquarters that the 504th infantry battalion, where we were to work, had been transferred 145 km to the south, to the area of Ras Gharib, a small settlement of Egyptian oil workers.
Having arrived at the place and listened to an energetic briefing by the senior adviser of the brigade, we stopped for the night in the "Khabir" dugout * [* - the Egyptians called all Soviet advisers and specialists Khabirs]. In the morning we began to prepare for departure.
For work, we were given a battered GAZ-63 truck. Two simple soldier's beds with mattresses full of bugs were placed in its covered body, all covered with shrapnel. Thus, for the first time, we had both a vehicle and even a roof over our heads. After tasting kvass, made from dry Egyptian flatbread, on the road, and warmly saying goodbye to the brigade advisers, we set off.
To be honest, while observing the road landscapes of the completely wild, but in its own way beautiful nature of the Red Sea coast, we did not experience gloomy forebodings. However, they did not feel any special joy from staying at this “resort”, where Russian tourists are now being lured. The battalion had to act in isolation from the main forces, in the event of a sharp deterioration in the operational-tactical situation, it was not necessary to count on the help of the brigade.
Black-brown hulls of burned-out vehicles stood along the roadside by the roadside. The Egyptian BTR-152 was especially remembered. He stood, buried in a roadside rock. A large ragged hole gaped in the rear side from an Israeli NURS fired by a Skyhawk or Mirage type aircraft. It was evident that a professional pilot "worked". I recalled the parting word of one of our Zaafaran colleagues: “In which case, leave the car and run in different directions into the desert. They will not launch missiles at an individual person.”
The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mustafa Zibib, and other Egyptian officers greeted us cordially. The battalion had only recently arrived in Ras Gharib and was now engaged in the engineering equipment of the positions. The dugouts are here, as in Zaafaraneu. it wasn’t there yet - they just didn’t have time to dig it. Therefore, for some time we had to spend the night under an awning taken from our truck. From above we covered the awning with a camouflage net. It immediately became clear that we do not have many things that are essential for life in the field. In this regard, the Egyptians helped us a lot at first. Another Surprise for us was the Ramadan that began then * [* - during the days of Ramadan, Muslims are forbidden to eat from sunrise to sunset].
Breakfast was brought only late in the evening. Already in the dark, sitting on beds under our awning, we ate unusual Arab food, which, moreover, was fairly flavored with sand. As for lunch and dinner, for the sake of sleep, we preferred to abandon them altogether. So we had to involuntarily fast, like all true Muslims.
On the second day, we began to get acquainted in detail with the situation, the forces and means at our disposal, as well as the area in which the 504th battalion was to operate.
The battalion was responsible for covering a section of the coast - 120 km along the front and 80 km in depth, which did not fit into any tactical standards. According to the combat mission, this Egyptian unit was intended to prevent a possible enemy amphibious landing on the coast and to ensure the security of "important facilities" in the sector. Particular attention was paid to ensuring the safety of the radar station. To reinforce the battalion from the brigade, additional forces were given: a company of T-34 tanks, a battery of 120-mm mortars and a mixed anti-tank battery of 57-mm guns and B-11 recoilless rifles. However, to repel enemy air raids, there were only three DShK machine guns.
In addition to our infantry battalion, in the Ras Gharib area there was a battalion of "People's Defense", staffed by soldiers of pre-retirement age. This kind of "vohra" was engaged in the protection of objects of the local oil company, and, frankly, there was little real benefit from such fighters.
Oil and everything related to it did not cause us any particular concern. According to our information, there was an unspoken agreement between Egypt and Israel not to touch such objects. Moreover, nearby, in Shukeyra, the same Egyptian company was extracting oil together with the Americans.
The real “headache” for us was the radio engineering company. More precisely, not the company itself, but its radar station, which the Arabs simply called “radar”.
Located on the hills 8 km from the coast and 5-6 km from our battalion, the radar conducted reconnaissance of air targets in the central sector of the Gulf of Suez. The station was guarded by a dozen soldiers, for whom trenches had not even been opened. The company commander himself was at the position of the so-called "false radar", closer to the coast, about 2 km from the real station.
The false radar was a mound with some kind of piece of iron stuck into it, apparently depicting a radar antenna. The object was covered by rows of barbed wire with signal mines and five batteries of twin anti-aircraft machine guns of Soviet and American production.
This position housed over 400 personnel. It was believed that in this way the enemy would be misled as to the true location of the radar.
Such a "wise" plan of the company commander was appropriately drawn up on a large sheet of drawing paper and approved by the ornate painting of the commander of the Egyptian radio engineering troops. Naturally, we immediately reported our categorical disagreement with this situation to the senior adviser of the brigade, who promised to sort it out.
By that time, almost the entire territory of the Red Sea Military District was a zone of active operations not only for Israeli fighter-bomber aircraft, but also for helicopters. It was the helicopters that posed a real threat, as they flew at low altitude, out of the radar visibility zone.

Radar P-12
I must say that in Zaafaran, in the area where the brigade was located, there was a second similar radar station. The Israelis bombed it repeatedly, but were never able to destroy it - Egyptian anti-aircraft artillery forced Israeli pilots to rise to two or three thousand meters, due to which the accuracy of the bombing dropped sharply. We have not yet been disturbed by enemy aircraft. But for some time now, with the onset of darkness, and especially on moonlit nights, helicopters began to appear in our sector.
Coming from the sea, between Zaafarana and Ras Gharib, they entered the depths of the desert and returned back to Sinai only by three or four in the morning. One could only guess about the purpose of their appearance with us and the nature of possible actions. It was considered quite probable that an enemy helicopter would land in the vicinity of the radar station in order to destroy it. In order to prevent such an operation from being carried out, we provided for the possibility of advancing one of the battalion companies to the “radar” position. Soon, in the presence of the chief of staff of the brigade, they even conducted a training session with the personnel of the company.
From morning until late in the evening we were engaged in the so-called organization of the battle: we carried out reconnaissance, clarified tasks for subunits on the ground, and determined firing positions for guns and mortars. At night, at the next appearance of enemy helicopters, they sat in the dugout of the battalion commander and anxiously awaited reports of their actions. At dawn, making sure that the helicopters had left our area, tired, they went to sleep under their tent.
For several weeks, the situation in the sector practically did not change. At night, I had to think not only about the possible reflection of the landing, but also about my own safety. A dugout has already been prepared for us. True, the door in it was not locked, and besides, there was no security. Every night, just in case, I had to take a machine gun from our driver Suleiman. It was funny to remember how even in Cairo, before leaving for the Red Sea, some important rank of political workers frightened us with his parting words: “Just try to be captured by the Jews - put party cards on the table ...”
After some time, a reconnaissance aircraft began to appear in the sky quite often. Everything indicated that the Israelis were carefully studying the area. However, the situation on the coast remained calm.
On the evening of December 26, after dinner, as always, they came to the battalion commander's dugout. We had to discuss the plan of work for the next day. At about twenty-two hours, a telephone message was received stating that two enemy helicopters had penetrated deep into our territory 50 km north of the battalion's location. This has happened before, so we, unfortunately, did not attach much importance to this message. During the conversation about current affairs Major Panchenko unexpectedly proposed to the battalion commander to raise the first company on alert and conduct a night training to advance to the proposed landing site of the enemy’s conditional landing.
To be honest, even today, thirty years later, it is difficult for me to say with complete certainty what was best for us then: to do or not to do this training. If such an exercise really took place, we would probably disrupt the operation of the enemy. Another question: "What consequences would await us?" Surely the next day, the Israelis would have mixed the battalion with sand with their air strikes.
There is no exaggeration in such an assumption. A familiar battalion adviser, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, who really knew in practice the full power of Israeli bombing on the Suez Canal, somehow compared the exchange of blows between Egyptian and Israeli troops: a window frame in an Arab's house."
Later, I became convinced that the response of the Israelis was indeed always more powerful and larger in its consequences. Of course, we were ready to fulfill our military duty and solve the tasks set by the command, but no one wanted to die in these wild Red Sea sands.
One way or another, but fate decreed in its own way. Lieutenant Colonel Zibib, having learned about our intentions to conduct a training session, expressed his dissatisfaction.
I think the battalion commander simply did not want to do this: the training would have ended only in the morning.
The discussion ended with the fact that we were shown an official instruction forbidding any training in the event of declaring one or another degree of combat readiness. The battalion was then really in the second degree of such readiness. There were no more new reports of the appearance of enemy helicopters, and everyone calmed down.

Even before midnight, the battalion commander suggested that everyone go to bed, which we did. Zibib himself, with the chief of staff, remained on duty in the dugout.
Tired of the day, I immediately fell asleep. Taras, as it turned out, did not sleep. Later, he said that then he had some kind of bad premonition. In the middle of the night, he unexpectedly woke me up: “Igor! Do you hear? Airplane hum. Come outside. Look what's there?
Half-asleep, I reluctantly got out of bed, put my foot into my shoes and, in just shorts and a T-shirt, left the dugout. It was chilly. A cold wind blew from the sea. The full moon shone brightly. In the distance, an unusually strong roar of jet engines of several aircraft was indeed heard.
“It must be a spy!” - I shouted, without even thinking: "What kind of aerial reconnaissance can be at night?".
The hum grew stronger. One of the planes was somewhere very close, although it was not visible. When I was about to go down the stairs, there was a strong explosion 200 meters away from me, and a second later. Bright flashes marked the gaps.
The air raid has begun. The clock showed twenty-five past one.
- Alert, bombing! I yelled and rolled head over heels down into the dugout.
Having quickly dressed and jumped out, they ran towards the dugout of the battalion commander, to which there were three hundred meters. The roar of jet engines tore at the air. Air bombs and rockets fired from the aircraft were exploding to the right and left.
In the dugout, where, in addition to the battalion commander, there were the chief of staff, an intelligence officer and a communications officer, we first of all asked to report on the situation.
“What can be the situation,” Lieutenant Colonel Zibib answered nervously. “Don’t you see that we are being bombed?”
- What do they report from the "radar"? Taras asked.
They are also being bombed.
We ourselves knew that the radio engineering company was being bombed, because we saw the red threads of tracers of anti-aircraft shells - the batteries of the false radar were firing. Our machine-gun platoon was silent. The battalion commander explained this by the fact that the planes were still not visible in the dark and firing was impractical.
“If we open fire, the enemy will bomb even harder,” Zibib noted.
The Arabs, fearing that the light in the dugout might be seen from the air, turned off the lamps. By telephone, they contacted the companies and the commander of the radio engineering company. By radio, they tried to establish contact with our "ambush" platoon, which, even before the raid, at twenty-two hours, was supposed to take its assigned position near the radar.
It turned out that all this time the platoon, in violation of the order, was not in ambush, but at the position of a false radar. The platoon commander, as we learned later, was drinking tea with the company commander. The platoon began to advance to the real radar only with the beginning of the air raid. Platoon commander's last message: “I can't move on. I'm being bombed." In the future, the senior lieutenant did not answer our calls.
A couple of days later, during a thorough survey of the area along the platoon advance route, we did not find a single crater.
The intensity of the air raid increased. At some moments it seemed that we simply would not make it until the morning. One of the bombs exploded between the battalion commander's dugout and the battalion's communication point. Somewhere at half past one in the night, the commander of the radio engineering company got in touch with us. He said that he sees a fire at the position of the radar. According to him, "the station itself, apparently, was destroyed by a bomb hit, since there is no connection with it." After that, the connection was interrupted. Soon wired communication with all other companies ceased. The battalion commander refused to send signalers: "Soldiers can die."
At half past five in the morning, one of the privates, put up by the battalion commander for observation, reported a strange sound. Running upstairs, we heard a very powerful and characteristic roar of helicopter engines. The first assumption: "The enemy, under the cover of aviation, intends to land troops!" They ran to the top of the nearest hill, from where for some seconds they noticed dark silhouettes moving away towards the desert. Then we never found out why the company did not open fire on these helicopters ...
Silence soon followed. Only a single rumble of an approaching aircraft is heard. Standing at the top of the hill, we did not even have time to discuss what we saw. Everything happened unexpectedly. With a sort of hiss and whistle, rockets fired from the plane flew over us as we rushed headlong away.
After releasing ammunition and turning on the afterburner, the plane went towards the Sinai Peninsula. There was silence again.
With difficulty moving our legs from fatigue, we trudged to our dugout. Our driver was there.
- Well, Suleiman, was it scary? – I asked as cheerfully as possible. In response, the soldier only somehow wryly smiled:
- Scary.
Without undressing lay down on the bed. About thirty or forty minutes later the phone rang.
“Mr. Igor,” the battalion commander turned to me. The Jews stole the radar.
Surprised, I didn't even realize.
How was it stolen? What exactly was stolen? The answer was unintelligible: either some important part was stolen, or a radar unit, or something else ...
A few minutes later we were again in the dugout of Lieutenant Colonel Zibib. Things were very bad. We understood this immediately, as soon as we saw the upset face of the battalion commander. From Zibib's confused explanations, it followed that "there is no more radar station at the position." She just disappeared! This was announced by radio by the platoon commander, who only now finally reached the place of his "ambush".
We decided that at dawn we would go to the radar and see for ourselves. We learned that as a result of the raid, two soldiers were killed in the battalion, more than a dozen were injured.
Having agreed that the battalion commander would inform us about the time of departure, we returned to our dugout. We took a little nap. However, at nine o'clock in the morning we were awakened by a major who had arrived from the brigade headquarters to analyze the incident.
The incident was investigated until the new year. We have not received an absolutely accurate picture of the operation carried out by the Israelis, but some details have come to light.
They remembered the frequent appearances of Israeli helicopters and reconnaissance aircraft - the enemy was carefully preparing for the operation. Interestingly, ten days before the incident, the battalion received an encrypted message through military intelligence channels about the training of Israeli paratroopers in the Sinai - they were practicing the capture of some object. The battalion commander then told us nothing about this cipher telegram.
It turned out that before the start of the air strike, about twenty-three hours or a little later, two heavy French-made Super Frelon helicopters (the heaviest helicopter in the Israeli Air Force at that time) flew into the radar position area with a capture group. It was about these helicopters that the air observation post told us. We found traces of the wheels of one of them at the landing site, in a deep hollow 300 m from the station. According to the specific footprints in the sand, the type of helicopter was determined.
The radar station was not working at that moment, and the calculation itself was engaged maintenance in the control room, so that the approach of enemy helicopters went unnoticed. Later, I accidentally learned from a sergeant of our economic platoon that he had personally seen the flight of two helicopters even before the start of the bombing and even reported this to the battalion commander by phone. But he said to him: “You have imagined everything. You're just a coward." I still don't know why Zibib didn't tell us about his conversation with the sergeant then.
One way or another, but by midnight the position of the radar station was already captured by the enemy. In the footsteps of the landing boots of the Israelis on the sand, it was possible to establish the routes of their advance to the station. Nearby, they also found the positions of machine gunners who covered the actions of the paratroopers. Two soldiers guarding the radar station were killed, the survivors fled into the desert.
The main part of the operation was already carried out under the cover of air strikes and bombings. The enemy, apparently, allowed the detection of the landing and therefore undertook an air raid: to press the battalion to the ground, to prevent it from advancing to the radar. Just in case, the Israelis even bombed the exit from the Zaafaran valley to the road to Ras Gharib. In total, Israeli aircraft made 36 sorties that night.
After capturing the radar position, three more heavy helicopters arrived there. Their appearance was also noticed by aerial surveillance posts. Having cut the mounting brackets with an autogen, the Israelis very professionally dismantled both parts of the radar station: the hardware and antenna-mast device of the radar - and on the external sling of two Super Frelons they transferred them to the Sinai Peninsula. Only the chassis of two ZIL-157 cars remained lonely in the position.
The diesel generator powering the radar was blown up by paratroopers. It was this burning diesel generator that the company commander saw from a false radar.
Together with the station, its crew was captured and abducted. Before leaving for Sinai, the Israelis carefully mined the position: there were both delayed-action land mines and conventional anti-personnel mines. In the cabs of ZILs, sappers found mines - "surprises".
This whole dark epic with the theft of the radar made a lot of noise. Among our advisers and specialists in Cairo, there was only talk about "how the Jews stole the radar on the Red Sea."
Later, with great surprise, we learned more and more details of that Israeli operation. One of these “experts” of all events taught us: “Since you knew that an enemy landing had landed, you should have mounted a tank and personally led the company’s advance to the radar. By destroying the landing force, you could earn a Red Star…”
Later, as if answering this monologue, Taras irritably remarked: “It’s better not to have these “stars” at all than to get them on scarlet pads.”
The consequences of what happened were too serious. The enemy managed to steal a completely modern P-12PM radar station, which at that time was in service not only with Egyptian, but also with Soviet air defense. The station operated in the meter range and had a detection range of about 200 km. In the troops, it was used not only for detecting air targets and issuing target designations to various air defense systems, but also for interfacing with automated control systems for air defense systems of the air defense forces of the Vozdukh country.
With the capture of the station, the enemy got the opportunity to get acquainted in detail with our system for identifying the nationality of the Kremniy-1 aircraft, installed on the radar.

WHO NEED A STATION?

The Israelis themselves preferred not to advertise the operation. In any case, the "Voice of Israel" from Jerusalem in Russian, who liked to comment on the news about the successes of the Israeli army, was stubbornly silent on this matter. Only a couple of months later, the BBC radio reported that "a group of American specialists is in Israel, which is studying a Soviet radar station stolen by Israeli paratroopers on the Red Sea coast." Thus, the assumption that our specialists from the radio engineering troops expressed was confirmed: “The station was needed not so much by the Israelis as by the Americans.”

Meanwhile, the clouds continued to gather over our heads. It was said that the case was allegedly under the control of President Nasser himself. And the conclusions really soon followed. All the main participants in the events - the commander of our 504th battalion, the commander of the radio engineering company, the commander of the "ambush" platoon, the commander of the RTV, the commander of the radio engineering battalion, which included the company, and eight fugitive soldiers were put on trial. With a bang, the commander of the military district was removed from his post and dismissed from the army.
On the personal instructions of Nasser, one of the best Egyptian generals of that time, Major General Saad ed-Din Shazli, a participant in the "Six-Day War" of 1967 and the fighting in Yemen, was appointed the new commander of the district. As part of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, he commanded special troops and was considered a great connoisseur of the tactics of the Israeli paratroopers. Later, on the eve of the October 1973 war, he was appointed Chief of the General Staff.
The meeting of the military tribunal took place already in January. It took place in one of the premises of the headquarters of the "Red Sea Military District" in El Gardak. Taras and I were also there. The battalion commander took us with him as witnesses. However, we were never invited to the court, only for a conversation with one of the staff officials.
At first we thought that everything would work out and the sentences would not be too harsh. However, things turned out to be much worse, especially for Zibib. Until now, I remember how this already middle-aged lieutenant colonel, at the last meeting with us, even before the end of the trial and the announcement of the verdict, wept bitterly, repeating only one word: “iadam” (death penalty). Apparently, he already knew his fate.
Indeed, the next day the tribunal sentenced Lieutenant Colonel Zibib and two other Ras-Gharib officers to death. The commander of the radio engineering troops and the commander of the radio engineering battalion received twenty-five years in prison. Such a harsh decision of the court then caused a great resonance among the Egyptian officers, who, on the whole, were sympathetic to the convicts. In connection with what happened in Ras Gharib, the Minister of War issued a special order, which was communicated to the entire officer corps of the Egyptian armed forces.
A month later, a new radar station was brought to Ras Gharib. Now she was surrounded not only barbed wire and anti-aircraft batteries, but also prepared for the explosion, although the Israelis were hardly going to "steal" the same station for the second time.
Two years later, during my second trip to Egypt, I accidentally met in Cairo the former commander of a machine-gun company from our battalion. I learned from him that the new Egyptian president, Anwar Sadat, had pardoned the convicts and Lieutenant Colonel Zibib was in good health. By that time, stations of this type had been modernized in the Union, and for another ten years they had been in service with the internal air defense districts.

The station of the meter range of waves P-14 with significant energy and a large detection range has gone down in history

In 2003, one event in the life of the radio engineering troops practically went unnoticed - the last P-14 radar station, without exaggeration, the troops’ favorite radar station, the last of 731 radar stations manufactured in 1959-76, left the combat strength.

The creation of a meter-wave station with significant energy and a long detection range (OKR "Lena") was set by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 526-321 of 14.03.55 and the Decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 1371-632 of 6.12. 57. The GRAU MO acted as the general customer, the executor was the Design Bureau of the Gorky Television Plant named after. IN AND. Lenin.

Creation

Vasily Ivanovich Ovsyanikov was appointed chief designer of the radar. SKB GTZ by that time had rich and unique experience in creating and supporting the production of P-3, P-8, P-10, P-12 meter-wave radars.

Naturally, all this experience was fully used in the creation of a new radar. As part of the R&D, Lena had to carry out a number of research projects. It was a landmark work for the team, significantly exceeding technical level and the volume of all the previous ones.

It required the development of a new powerful generator lamp, spark gaps, a high-frequency cable of high electrical strength, high-voltage power supplies, new insulating materials and other components.

The volume of equipment (about a hundred blocks) did not allow using the previously used method of mounting radio elements on bulky chassis and cabinets. Designers and technologists developed unified standard racks and chassis blocks that were inserted into these racks. The block-functional method of construction made it possible to significantly reduce the complexity of manufacturing equipment, increase the maintainability of the station, and ensure that installation and adjustment work is carried out on a wide front.

However, despite the hard work of the team, there was a lag in terms of development and, above all, at the stage of manufacturing a sample. Obviously, the capacity of the experimental workshop was not enough. The supply of basic components and materials was not ensured.

The workplace of the operator of the 5N84A Oborona radar.
A photo:

The layout of the main equipment was made in the conditions of the experimental workshop, the antenna was made without a slipway, the antenna-feeder path (cables, current collector, transitions) could not withstand the full load. The bulk of the work was transferred to the landfill. Tensions were felt in the team: SKB could not complete the task of developing the main RTV air defense station.

In the summer of 1957, the management of the design bureau, chief designer V.I. Ovsyanikov and the head of the Council of National Economy were summoned to a meeting of the Commission on Military-Industrial Issues under the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR with a report on the status of work on the Lena R&D. At the enterprise, of course, nothing good was expected from this procedure.

After the report of the chief designer and explanations of the reasons for the delay in the manufacture of the sample, Academician A.N. Shchukin, a prominent specialist in radar, unexpectedly proposed to shorten the development-production cycle by making not one sample, but as many as five. Representatives of the plant were amazed, remembering with what difficulty only the layout was made. However, the decision was made.

At the same time, the Commission gave a number of instructions to the Ministry of Electronic Industry, the Council of the National Economy, and the Ministry of the Electrical Industry to ensure the accelerated production of radar samples. Stock notices (with a "red stripe") were allocated for scarce components and even vehicles. After the decision of the military-industrial complex, work accelerated significantly.

Part of the equipment was manufactured in the workshops of the plant, antennas - at the aircraft plant, antenna rotation drive - at the plant of milling machines. After the manufacture of the main equipment, the center of gravity of the work moved to the site, where round-the-clock work was organized. Factory tests were completed quite quickly - in the summer of 1958. Together, the task of developing and handing over five samples to the customer was completed.

One prototype radar was sent for state testing at the Donguz GRAU test site, located in the steppes of the Orenburg region. Station tests were successful. However, there was an emergency, as a result of which state tests were interrupted. The calculation of the station did not turn on the heating system in a timely manner to remove icing from the antenna mirror panels. This led to the destruction of the panels and the heating system itself. The State Commission, however, did not present any claims, tk. there was a decision on a special test of the strength of the antenna in extreme conditions. The experimental workshop produced reinforced panels within 10 days, which were delivered by special flight to the landfill. The antenna was restored in three days.

At the beginning of 1959, three of the first four radar stations were sent by rail to the troops. One of them - to Cape Fiolent, 20 km from Sevastopol, the other - to the area of Lake Khasan in the Far East, the third - in the village of North-East Bank (Azerbaijan). The fifth set was sent for periodic control tests.

After successful State tests, by the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the USSR No. 640-283 of 16.6.59 and the order of the USSR Ministry of Defense of 07.20.1959 No. 0057, the P-14 radar was put into service.

In 1959, at the Gorky Television Plant named after. IN AND. Lenin began mass production of stations, which continued until 1976. A total of 731 sets were produced. 24 sets were exported.

The first samples of the radar were supplied to the troops with two sets of antennas, one of which was installed in the main position, the other in the spare. Subsequently, spare antennas were widely used to connect to the P-12 radar, seriously increasing its field of view.

Design features

As you know, the energy potential of the radar is determined by the transmitter power, receiver sensitivity and amplifying (compared to an elementary dipole) properties of the antenna. In the P-14 radar station being created, the receiver has not fundamentally changed in comparison with the P-12, and the transmitter and antenna have become qualitatively new and more powerful.

The transmitter was built according to the classical scheme of that time:

a microwave generator with self-excitation on a powerful metal-glass radio tube-triode GI-5B and an oscillatory system in the form of a set of coaxial brass pipes repeated the design of the P-12 radar generator, only the pipes were larger in diameter, in size GI-5B. The generator produced unmodulated "smooth" microwave pulses with a power of at least 700 kW and a duration of 10 microseconds;

modulator - with full discharge of storage (artificial long line) and ion switch - thyratron TGI-700-1000/25.

To protect against active interference, a tuning system for four spare frequencies was used in the selected frequency range. Four elements in the microwave generator and one element in the high-frequency amplifier unit in the receiving device were rebuilt by means of synchronous servo drives on the synchros by executive electric motors. The automatic frequency control system provided the necessary pairing of the frequencies of the receiver local oscillator and the microwave transmitter generator over the entire tuning range.

Radar 5N84A "Defense" and a new generation radar "Opponent-G" in Ashuluk.
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

Structurally, the modulator was placed in a set of identical large blocks-cubes, standing in one row: a high-voltage rectifier, a charging inductor block, a pulse transformer block with subunits of a thyratron and a rectifier, and two storage blocks. On top of these blocks on a frame of steel channel horizontally lay the "pipe" of the microwave generator with automata of the frequency tuning system of the generator.

The radar antenna was completely unusual for a meter-wave radar - a mirror type. The mirror was a cutout of a paraboloid of double curvature measuring 32 by 11 meters. An irradiator (two half-wave vibrators with a counter-reflector) was placed at the focus of the antenna on a long truss. The directivity of the antenna was 600. The antenna formed a cose-square radiation pattern with a zone ceiling (with one dip) of 45 km.

The appearance of such a powerful antenna made it possible for the first time in real radars to use the Sun as a source of radio emission to record the antenna pattern in the vertical plane. The zone was corrected by moving the irradiator in the vertical plane.

Also, for the first time, such a parameter as the sensitivity of the receiving path was introduced, which received the slang name "sensitivity in a large circle" among the troops. To measure the parameter in a fixed place, a special measuring antenna, a control dipole, was attached to the antenna mirror.

A calibrated signal from a standard signal generator was fed to it via a coaxial cable. The signal emitted by the dipole was received by the radar antenna, passed through the entire antenna-feeder path and entered the receiver. The level of the signal supplied from the GSS, when a given signal-to-noise ratio was reached at the receiver output, determined the value of the sensitivity of the receiving path. This parameter made it possible to objectively assess the state of the antenna-feeder path at low signal levels and was a good diagnostic tool when troubleshooting it.

The design of the antenna consisted of two trunks - vertical and horizontal. The barrels were assembled on bolts from sections welded from steel profiles and pipes. Flat trusses made of duralumin tubes were attached to the horizontal shaft; Ceramic insulators were attached to the tubes forming the inner surface of the mirror. Galvanized steel wire with a diameter of 0.8 mm was attached to these insulators. Despite the large size, the antenna was mounted without the use of a crane - all the equipment necessary for mounting was included in the delivery.

To combat icing, this wire could be passed electricity(30 kW). To provide the necessary current strength, several step-down transformers were placed on the vertical shaft.

However, it should be recognized that in the European Arctic and on the Far East coast, where heavy precipitation in the form of sleet and rain at sub-zero air temperatures is a fairly common occurrence, many antennas were destroyed.

Microwave energy was transmitted through a coaxial cable with a diameter of about five centimeters, in a lead sheath. To transfer energy from the fixed part of the antenna to the moving one, a special coaxial high-frequency current collector was used.

It should be noted that the joints of the high-frequency path were the weakest and most unreliable place in the radar. In the place of the slightest violation of contact, the transition quickly burned with the melting of the polyethylene insulator. And the high-frequency current collector and cable were constantly in short supply.

The significant power of the transmitter in combination with a large reflector antenna made it possible to form a visibility zone with a radio horizon realization coefficient close to unity. The radar confidently detected both low-flying targets and spacecraft on the ascending and descending sections of the flight path. It was for these purposes that the scale of 1200 km was subsequently added.

The presence of a large antenna, which had significant inertia, required the use of an original system for its rotation.

At the far end of building No. 1 (about the placement of the station a little lower), on a concrete foundation, there was an antenna base (like a bookcase about 4 meters high), assembled from metal structures.

At the top of the base lay the upper gearbox. The antenna mirror through the cross rested on the large gear of the upper gearbox. The upper point of the vertical shaft of the antenna was held in a vertical position by means of a bearing by six braces (steel cables) pulled by hand winches standing on concrete foundations.

In focus radar antennas 5H84A on a long truss, an irradiator is placed - two half-wave vibrators with a counter-reflector.
Photo: Georgy DANILOV

Approximately in the middle of the "whatnot" on a frame made of steel angle a large gearbox with a set of gears was attached. For the first time, electromagnetic clutches were used for remote gear shifting. The shaft of the upper gearbox was connected to the output shaft of the gearbox by means of a powerful cardan shaft with two crosses.

Two powerful AC motors connected "shaft to shaft" were connected to the box on one side; on the other side of the box, an EMU-100 electric machine amplifier and an MI-100 direct current electric motor stood side by side.

The system operated in three modes: "start" mode (DC drive smoothly "accelerated" the antenna from the stopped position to a speed of 2 rpm); operating mode of antenna rotation from an AC drive at a speed of 2, 4, 6 rpm; setting mode for a given azimuth (in this case, a direct current drive was used, in a conventional single-channel SSP system on synchros).

To protect against passive interference, a coherent-pulse moving target selection system (MPS) was used. In fairness, we must remember that the system was originally called the SPC (selection of moving targets). The interperiod compensation circuit (CPC) was built on subtractive potentialoscopes LN-5 (LN-9) and could operate in single or double subtraction modes.

In the single subtraction mode, the first potentialoscope was used to isolate non-synchronous impulse noise signals and compensate them in the field of view outside passive noise. The use of potentialoscopes in the FPC scheme made it easy to apply asymmetric triggering to reduce the zone of "blind" velocities of the SDC system.

The SDC equipment was switched on manually, by installing special zones - "strobes", in which an echo passed through the protection equipment was fed to the indicators. In total, three such zones could be formed: the "local" strobe zone - circular in azimuth from zero to 600 km - to compensate for reflections from local objects; two zones of strobes are "dipole" (installed at any range, length and width in azimuth).

The dimensions of the "dipole" strobe zones were the same and differed only in the azimuth position. In the "dipole" strobe zones, it was possible to compensate for the Doppler frequency addition due to the displacement of passive noise in space under the action of the wind.

Setting the size of the strobes, adjusting the wind compensation scheme was carried out manually by means of controls (switches and knobs) on the radar units.

The radar indicator equipment consisted of three identical indicators: one all-round visibility indicator (IKO) in the radar building and two remote IKO (VIKO) located at the command post (PU) of the unit (at a distance of up to 1 kilometer from the radar).

Since 1967, a new block with a cathode ray tube with a diameter of 45 cm instead of a 35 cm one was installed in the radar station, which significantly improved the conditions for monitoring the air situation. The control indicator was located in the same rack, on the screen of which one could observe signals from the outputs of the receiving device, the CPC system, and also use it as a built-in oscilloscope when setting up and repairing equipment. It should be noted that both indicators provided a well-focused and contrasting "picture", creating a comfortable working environment for the operator, and there was practically no reason to use the attached oscilloscope.

The difference between VIKO and IKO was due to different primary supply voltages. In addition, to ensure the necessary accuracy of transmitting information about the current azimuth of the antenna, a two-channel synchronous servo drive on synchros was used, in contrast to a single-channel one on the PPI.

VIKO was connected to the radar with two cables - high-frequency coaxial and multi-core signal.

Screen view of the all-round visibility indicator of the 5N84A Oborona radar.
Photo: Photo archive of East Kazakhstan region

To determine ownership aircraft to their Armed Forces, the radar station had a ground-based radar interrogator NRZ-14M ("Tantal-M"), which was a modification of the NRZ-15 from the P-15 radar. To ensure that the size of the identification zone is not less than the radar detection zone for the NRZ-14M, a new antenna was developed, which is a passive phased antenna array.

The equipment was built on the element base of the first generation, in total about 360 radio tubes were used.

The radar was powered by electrical power units based on a very reliable, unpretentious four-cylinder YaMZ-204G diesel engine manufactured by the Yaroslavl Motor Plant. The supply voltage was non-standard - 200 Volts, 400 Hz. Two of the four units worked simultaneously - one for the equipment, the other for the antenna rotation system. One of the reserve units was used to heat the antenna mirror. To power the VIKO, two gasoline units were supplied in the kit, generating a 3-phase voltage of 220 V 50 Hz.

Otherwise, the radar did not have any fundamental differences from the well-established and classic principles for constructing the same P-12 radar.

It should be noted that there is a well-developed and convenient operational documentation. The breakdown of radar systems into small functionally completed blocks made it possible to create a product that is easy to study and operate. Electrical circuit diagrams radar units were distinguished by a well-readable and understandable construction and ensured the rapid recovery of failed units and systems. In the troops, the radar station had another name - "Dubrava".

Home for the station

Placing a radar station in a stationary building was also not a new phenomenon. All meter-range radars from P-3 to P-12 were also produced in stationary "packaging" versions and deployed in adapted rooms.

For the first time, specially designed buildings were built for a mass-produced radar station - post No. 1 to accommodate equipment and post No. 2 for a power plant.

The main part of the brick building No. 1 was divided into 4 rooms. Along the long walls to the right and left were narrow ventilation rooms; in the middle is the largest room with all the receiving and indicating equipment; to the left of it, between the left ventilation and control room, there was a room for a transmitter with a cabinet for a tuning system without radiation. The rest of the building was occupied by a corridor, a room for a stoker (water heating) and a spare parts room. However, the room for spare parts was most often used as a classroom. The last two rooms in different building projects had different sizes and placements. There was a project for a building constructed from a wooden beam.

The antenna was installed near the building of post No. 1 on a free-standing metal mast about two meters high on a special turntable with an MI-32 direct current actuator. A single-channel synchronous-servo drive with an electric machine amplifier provided synchronous and in-phase rotation of the NRZ antenna with the radar antenna.

The brick building of Post No. 2 housed a diesel power plant. In the main spacious room in one row, with radiators to the ventilation windows in the long wall of the building, four diesel units were installed. To refuel the units, a diesel fuel supply system with pipelines, a hand pump and a settling tank was installed in the building. The stock of diesel fuel was stored in two bunded metal tanks, tanks of 25 cubic meters each.

Both buildings had a heating system with hot water boilers. But in the building of post No. 2, heating was most often not used: there was enough heat from warming up diesel units.

Improvements and upgrades

Over the long life of the radar, several improvements were made.

Approximately since 1967, sets of indicator equipment were supplied on a 45LM1V cathode-ray tube. But still, the main amount was finalized during the overhaul. At the same time, a scale of 1200 km was introduced, which is used to detect spacecraft on their descent trajectory.

Some stations were supplied with a set of "Commutator", consisting of two units - network frequency converters VPL-30 (PSCH-30) and switching equipment that provides power to the radar from the industrial network and the transition to power from diesel units.

In the early 1970s the subunit of the thyratron was replaced in the modulator of the transmitter. In the new subunit, there was a new TGI-1000 thyratron of half the volume (compared to TGI-700), which made it possible to reduce the radar turn-on time from 8.5 minutes to 4.5. In the mid 1970s. in the P-14 radar, the Commutator-14 protection equipment against homing anti-radar projectiles was built in.

At the same time, the forces of the troops carried out the well-known at the time refinement "Condenser" or "ARP" - a scheme for automatically adjusting the threshold in the radar video path, which allowed in a simple way significantly improve the observability of marks from targets against the background of active noise interference.

For the first time on the P-14 radar, it was tested and received a start in life for preventive maintenance by the aggregate method. This made it possible to extend the life of the station by one or two years. This type of military repair subsequently received some distribution on other samples of radar equipment.

The high maintainability of the radar design made it possible to carry out two or three overhaul stations. The quality of the repair performed by the Samara Repair Enterprise of the Air Defense Forces was quite high.

For the first time, a target and interference simulator was built into the P-14 radar, providing initial training for operators, especially in those areas of the country where there were no intensive aviation flights.

The radar turned out to be very reliable and easy to use. Both the use of proven circuit design solutions and the stationary placement of equipment, which ensures a stable temperature regime equipment operation.

P-14 was distinguished by a number of undoubted advantages:

stationary placement provided comfortable living conditions for the crew of the station;

the high power of the transmitter, combined with a large antenna unique for the meter wavelength range, made it possible to form a very good, no-slip detection zone;

a stable analog SDC system, combined with a good field of view, made the radar indispensable for reliable detection of low-flying targets;

long-range detection and stable tracking of radar targets with a clear and contrasting mark on the IKO contributed to the popularity of the radar among aviation guidance navigators.

The calculation of the station included two officers. This ensured (with a heavy workload of officers of the RTV air defense units on issues of combat duty and life support) continuous qualified technical operation of the equipment. The captain category of the position of the head of the radar station provided a fairly high stability of personnel and a good level of training.

With all the positive qualities that distinguished Lena from the rest of the radar stations of the radio engineering air defense forces, there was one clearly obvious drawback - the stationarity of the station.

After the reorganization of the Ministry of Defense, the 4th GU MO (hereinafter GUV PVO) becomes the general customer of radar equipment for the Air Defense Forces. In August 1967, the general customer of the Air Defense Forces issued new tactical and technical requirements to the enterprise for the modernization of the P-14 radar, called the P-14F "Van" (5N84). The prototype radar was designed and manufactured on the basis of the decision of the Ministry of Radio Industry and the Main Directorate of Air Defense of February 25, 1967. The radar began to be mass-produced in 1968. The chief designer was Flaum A.M.

The radar equipment was located in three OdAZ-828 trailers (AP-1 - with a transmitter, AP-2 - with all other equipment, except for the VIKO, AP-3 - a half-empty cabin, which housed two VIKOs, interface equipment with ACS. In addition , it could house radio altimeter indicator cabinets.

Of the fundamental innovations, one can note the possibility of quickly changing the elevation position of the view area ("regular" - "high-altitude" modes) by introducing an additional third vibrator with a high-speed high-frequency switch into the antenna feed.

The main performance characteristics of the radar have not changed.

The upgraded radar, having become transportable, lost all the advantages of a stationary location, but acquired new qualities. It was easier to equip the troops (there was no need for long-term and costly capital construction). It became possible to change the place of deployment, it was simplified to send the radar for major repairs.

In 1960, the SKB team for the development of the P-14 radar was awarded a high award - the Lenin Prize. The winners of the award were V.I. Ovsyanikov, R.M. Glukhikh, N.I. Polezhaev, Yu.N. Sokolov, A.M. Klyachev, I.Ts. Grosman, A.I. Smirnov.

Eduard GONCHAROV
colonel, head of the P-14 radar station in 1972-76, in 1978-1995. Served in the engineering and radar service of the Office of the Head of the RTV Air Defense.

On the night of December 26-27, 1969, during an acrobatic operation behind enemy lines, Israeli paratroopers stole a Russian P-12 radar and transported it by helicopter to Israel.
In light of Russia's recent threats to supply S-300 air defense systems to Syria, today this story takes on a new meaning :)

Alexander Shulman
Tarnegol-53: The hijacking of the Russian P-12 radar

After Israel's victory in the Six-Day War in 1967, a lull settled in the Middle East. The total defeat of the armies of the Arab countries, supported and armed by the Soviet Union, deprived the Arabs of huge arsenals of Russian weapons - the Israelis destroyed or captured more than four thousand Russian tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces and other heavy weapons. The losses of the air forces of the Arab countries amounted to more than 400 Russian-made combat aircraft.