Lexington-class battlecruisers. O-class battlecruisers. Germany
type Lexington
Construction and service
general information
Booking
Armament
Main caliber
- 8 (4 x 2) - 406mm/50 Mark 2.
Mine caliber
- 16 x 1 - 152mm/53 Mark 13.
Flak
- 4 x 1 - 76mm/23 Mark 11.
torpedo tubes
- 8 x 1 - 533 mm.
Built ships
Were laid down, but not completed according to the project:
USS Lexington(CC-1);
USS Constellation(CC-2);
USS Saratoga(CC-3);
USS Ranger(CC-4);
USS constitution(CC-5);
USS United States(CC-6).
History of creation
background
Views on the role of battlecruisers and the required characteristics have changed again - the project of the "American Kongō” 1912 did not answer them. New ships ( project 1916) was to become the basis of high-speed (35-knot) formations of the fleet, in which they would go on a par with destroyers and cruisers of the type Omaha. The requirement for such a high speed for such large ships made it necessary to put into the project a huge machine power of 180,000 hp at that time, which, in turn, increased the displacement to almost 35,000 tons and left neither weight nor volume for reinforcement booking and PTZ. Taking into account the growth in size, the security of the ship relative to the 1912 project of the year only worsened. The armor was arranged according to the “all or nothing” principle: an incomplete belt along the waterline 203 mm thick (thinning to 127 mm at the lower edge) and 178 mm traverse bulkheads, together with the armored deck, provided protection for the citadel, beyond which the ship had practically no armor, except for the GK towers (279 ... 127 mm, with 229 mm barbets). Anti-mine caliber artillery of twenty 127-mm guns was not covered in any way (8 of them stood on superstructures even without shields). The main caliber was reinforced in relation to the 1912 project: two of the four turrets were made three-gun, bringing the number of 356-mm guns on the ship to ten.
Battle cruiser Lexington, the proposed view according to the project of 1916
The armament of the cruiser was supplemented by four 533-mm surface torpedo tubes in the stern and 4 underwater ones in the bow. A significant part of the internal volumes was occupied by the power plant: at that level of development of technology, the dimensions of its units turned out to be such that even a colossal 270-meter hull was not enough to place engine and boiler rooms in series one after another and below the waterline. Half of the 24 boilers had to be "squeezed" close to the sides - on the sides of two long engine rooms. The remaining 12 boilers were located above the waterline along the diametrical plane of the hull, on top of the armored deck above the engine rooms. Chimneys from numerous boilers were led into seven tall and thin chimneys arranged in a checkerboard pattern - such a "forest" of pipes gave the ships of this project a unique appearance. There were no anti-torpedo bulkheads, only small side boules on the hull. Considering how the power plant was arranged, any damage to the underwater part would threaten the cruiser with immediate flooding of part of the boiler rooms and a drop in output power on the shafts.
Projects of battlecruisers of 1916 and 1917
The laying of the cruisers was planned for 1917, but even then it did not take place. With the US entry into world war the issue of a shortage of transports and escort ships became acute, therefore, for the sake of the mass construction of such ships, the construction of large warships was postponed. The forced pause was used for the next alterations of the project - especially since the recent Jutland battle provided rich food for thought. AT project of 1917 the main caliber was reinforced again, moving from ten 356-mm guns to eight 406-mm guns; 127-mm anti-mine caliber guns gave way to more powerful 152-mm ones. New, more advanced boilers made it possible to reduce their number from 24 to 20 (by removing 4 of the 12 "upper tier" boilers), leaving only 5 pipes instead of seven. They did not change the armor protection, fearing for the strength of the hull.
Suggested by the Royal Navy (1917-1920)
By 1918, the United States became aware of the latest battlecruiser - Hood, recently laid down at a British shipyard, whose design most fully absorbed the experience of the Battle of Jutland. Not without reason Hood was considered a battleship of a new type - combining the speed of a battlecruiser with armor protection and armament of a battleship. As part of the fleet, such a ship was able to fully perform the tasks of both a battleship and a battlecruiser at the level of the best of them. It is not surprising that the leadership of the US Navy wished to acquire similar ships.
Battle cruiser Hood, United Kingdom
To this end, the project of the future Lexington once again undertook to redo. slogan new version cruiser was announced "maximum possible speed, firepower and armor protection". There were no problems with the first - the projects of 1916 and 1917. and so were speedy beyond measure. "Maximum firepower" was achieved by installing the latest 50-caliber 406-mm guns on the cruiser, indeed one of the most powerful in the world at that time.
As for the "maximum possible armor protection", it still remained only a good wish: it was possible to bring the cruiser's armor to the level of even not the most protected battleships, only by sacrificing speed or significantly increasing the displacement - which they did not want to go for. Nevertheless, a lot of work was done on the project in order to strengthen the armor and survivability of the ship, and their British colleagues helped the US specialists a lot in this. Handing over to the Americans project documentation by battlecruiser Hood and data from the analysis of combat damage to the ships of the Royal Navy during the Battle of Jutland, the British provided the American designers with valuable practical experience, which they did not fail to use. In particular, they supplied the future Lexingtons with anti-torpedo protection, for which they widened the hull and provided armored anti-torpedo bulkheads in it. The belt armor was given a reverse bevel, which increased its resistance against projectiles flying from afar (reducing, however, the thickness of the belt from 203 to 178 mm).
Battle cruiser Lexington, final view (drawing by F. Muller)
The tiller compartment was covered with 114-76 mm armored steel, and the freeboard above the armor belt and the upper deck were protected with 57 mm armor. The protection of towers, cellars and the conning tower was also revised in order to increase their survivability. In the project, the planned type of boilers was again changed - now 16 boilers instead of twenty provided steam for the turbines; due to the rearrangement, all boilers were placed under the main armored deck, abandoning the almost unprotected "upper tier" of boiler rooms. All chimneys were led into two large pipes (instead of five according to the previous project).
The alteration of the project resulted in a solid increase in displacement - now it has exceeded 44,000 tons. Thus, the cruiser was to become the largest ship of the US Navy, leaving far behind the then latest battleships of the type Colorado. The wider hull of the cruiser was no longer expected to be dispersed to 35 knots - but lowering the speed by 2 knots was more than a moderate price for the appearance of PTZ on the ship, and even so Lexington remained the fastest in its class.
Battlecruiser projections Lexington, final draft 1919
After all the delays, in August 1920 the first of the American battlecruisers was finally laid down at the shipyard in Newport News.
building
The first at the shipyard "Newport-News Shipbuilding" (Eng. Newport News Shipbuilding) - in the city of Newport News, Virginia - August 20, 1920 battlecruiser laid down Constellation , designated as CC-2.
The lead ship with the designation CC-1 was laid down only January 8, 1921 at the Four River Shipyard Fore River Shipyard) in Quincy, Massachusetts. When bookmarked, it was named constitution .
Finally, the last laid CC-4 Lexington - June 23, 1921, at the Newport News Shipbuilding shipyard.
Later, the names were “castled”, changing them between the ships under construction: the lead constitution turned into Lexington, former Lexington became a Ranger, and the former Ranger renamed to constitution. Thus, the ships under construction began to be called:
- CC-1 Lexington ;
- CC-2 Constellation ;
- CC-3 Saratoga ;
- CC-4 Ranger ;
- CC-5 constitution ;
- CC-6 United States .
The construction of the cruisers went on schedule until February 1922, when the United States, among other powers, signed the Washington Naval Treaty. According to its terms, the number and tonnage of "capital ships" - battleships and battlecruisers - were limited. Most of the unfinished ships of these classes in Japan, Great Britain and the United States were to be stopped by construction and disposed of. This was the end of the history of battlecruisers of the type Lexington: in February 1922, their construction was stopped when the ships were about 30% ready on average.
The fate of ships after 1922
What to do next with the colossal hulls of unfinished cruisers was decided for several more months. Even rather exotic ideas were put forward, such as the restructuring of one or more of them into transatlantic liners. In the end, it was decided to take advantage of that clause of the Washington Agreement, which allowed the United States to rebuild two of the “capital ships” canceled by the construction into aircraft carriers.
Rear Admiral David W. Taylor (left) and Rear Admiral John C. Raubison (right) hold a model of a battlecruiser over a model of an aircraft carrier the cruiser is to be rebuilt into, photo March 8, 1922
For rebuilding, the most advanced cruisers were chosen: CC-1 Lexington(readiness 33.8%) and CC-3 Saratoga(readiness 35.4%). First CV-3 Saratoga(October 30, 1922), then CV-2 Lexington(November 22, 1922) ordered again as aircraft carriers. They were launched on April 7 and October 3, 1925, respectively, and they entered service on November 16 and December 14, 1927. In the role of aircraft carriers, these ships became landmarks for world shipbuilding, both actively participated in the Second World War - moreover Saratoga even survived it and was sunk only in 1946 during the testing of atomic weapons. However, this is another story, for battlecruisers of the type Lexington having only a distant relation.
Aircraft carriers Saratoga and Lexington in Puget Sound, 1929
As for the other four ships, they never found use and rusted on the stocks until they were dismantled in August 1923.
Design Description
Hull and armor
The extreme requirements for the speed qualities of future battlecruisers (not even every destroyer of those years could develop 35 knots) forced the designers to use a very long (266 m) and narrow hull. The super-powerful propulsion plant at that time - again necessary to achieve the design speed - occupying very large volumes in the hull, forced the heavy main battery turrets to be carried far to the extremities, which further exacerbated the problems with the longitudinal strength of the structure, especially when firing in full volleys. All this was combined with the requirement of every possible lightening of the power set and skin in order to save as much weight as possible under the already modest armor. These problems were not new: a number of British battlecruisers, created according to a similar ideology (maximum speed with maximum firepower), plating sheets diverged during firing from the main caliber due to insufficient hull strength. The task before the American designers was difficult, but, judging by the successful service of the cruisers converted into aircraft carriers, they coped with it well.
The high (freeboard over 8 m) and long hull had a large forecastle, continuing aft to the end towers, approximately 3/4 of the total length of the ship. The "clipper" stem was traditional for American battleships of those years, and the contours of the bow were made in a bulbous shape - also widely used on all large US ships, starting with the battleship Delaware .
At the preliminary design stage, the possibility of including belt armor in the supporting structure of the hull was considered, which promised significant weight savings (later the Japanese used this solution in their heavy cruisers), but due to the complexity of implementation, the Lexingtons abandoned this. But in ensuring the longitudinal strength of the hull, 3 armored decks: bearing on top of the hull, protected by two layers of armor with a total thickness of 57 mm, protective 38 mm, running along the top of the armor belt 3 m above the waterline, and anti-fragmentation 51 mm deck below it, located just above the waterline. This latter was not made of armor, but of two layers of specially treated steel (STS, from the English. "Special treatment steel"). The longitudinal bulkhead, originally conceived between the protective and anti-shatter decks, was extended to the very bottom for greater strength of the hull.
long length armor belt(over 160 m) was dictated by the distance between the end towers. The belt ran along the height of two interdeck spaces of the same 178 mm thickness, and below the waterline it was thinned to 127 mm. The armored belt received an outward slope of 11 degrees, and above it, the side to the height of two more decks was protected by 57-mm armor, tilted inward by 10 degrees. From the bow and stern, the armored belt was closed by 178-mm traverses.
Towers of the main caliber had a frontal plate 279 mm thick with 152 mm side walls and a 127 mm roof. The barbettes were protected by 229 mm armor, decreasing to 127 mm below the armored decks.
Conning tower was covered by the thickest on the cruiser, 305-mm armor; cables and communication lines going from the cabin down were enclosed in a 254-mm armored tube.
Anti-torpedo protection extended along the body for the entire length of the armored belt; it included from three (at the extremities) to six (midships) armored bulkheads with a thickness of 19 to 10 mm, the space between which could be used as fuel tanks (so that oil would absorb the energy of the explosion).
Tiller compartment The cruiser was covered with two layers of STS steel with a total thickness of 114 to 76 mm.
Power plant and driving performance
In order for the 45,000-ton giants to be able to reach speeds of over 33 knots, a power plant (PP) was required, unprecedented at that time power at 180,000 hp; could only provide such power steam turbines. When transmitting torque from high-speed turbine rotors to propellers, it was necessary either to reduce the number of revolutions several times, or - with a direct connection of turbines to propellers - to reduce the speed of the turbine itself, forcing it to work in a non-optimal mode. Only by the end of the 1920s were they mastered in production and brought to an acceptable degree of reliability turbo gear units(TZA), due to a powerful gearbox, providing a decrease in speed from the turbines to the propeller shafts; before that, on steam turbine ships in most countries, a direct connection of turbine rotors to shafts was used. The Americans, on many large ships of those years, used a different solution - turboelectric a power plant, in which all the power of the turbines was spent on powering electric generators, and electric motors (EMs) connected to propellers were already fed from them.
Designed for battlecruisers, the switching scheme for turbogenerators (TG) on ED made it possible to obtain 17 options for using PP, including in emergency situations upon failure of individual units. This made the power plant very maneuverable, reliable and economical at low speeds (when part of the TG was turned off, and the rest worked with high efficiency). Thus, there was no need for a complicated and unreliable gear reducer. Also, a special reverse turbine was not needed, since changing the direction of rotation of the propeller shafts was achieved simply by switching the electrical polarity - at the same time, the reverse speed could almost equal the full forward speed. In addition, propeller EMs, the power to which was transmitted via electric cables, and not through bulky steam pipelines, were located far aft from the engine room, making the propeller shafts short (only 14% of the hull length along the overhead line) - which reduced vibration at full speed.
Turboelectric power plants also had their drawbacks: large weight and volume, complexity of debugging and maintenance, the need for forced ventilation to remove heat and remove humid sea air, the risk of short circuits and fires with increasing humidity and flooding. The weak link of this system was a compartment with powerful electric automatics that ensured circuit switching: there is a known case on August 31, 1942, when a Japanese submarine left an aircraft carrier with the only successful hit by a torpedo on the starboard side Saratoga completely de-energized for five whole minutes, and under its own power the ship was able to move only the next day.
On battle cruisers Lexington UE included:
In addition to the main ones, above the engine rooms were mounted six auxiliary DC turbogenerators 750 kW each - they powered the drives of fans, fire pumps and steering gears, as well as lighting, searchlights and a fire control system. Total weight of mechanisms reached 8643 tons, of which 7100 tons accounted for the main power plant.
Lexington generators power the city of Tacoma during a drought in Washington state, 1930
The record power of the power plant provided the ships with incomparable speed qualities even over long distances: for example, their first long-distance passage from San Pedro to Honolulu Lexington completed in 72 hours 34 minutes, showing an average speed of 30.7 knots.
The estimated cruising range of battlecruisers with a 10-knot course was 10,000 miles. In practice, completed as aircraft carriers, they carried a reserve of 6775 tons of oil, of which it was possible to use no more than 5487 tons. However, this was quite enough for the estimated range: for example, Saratoga covered 9910 miles at an average speed of 10.7 knots, using 4613 tons of oil.
The flip side of the record power and speed was the poor maneuverability of battlecruisers, inherited by aircraft carriers based on them. The huge mass and large (8.3: 1) ratio of length to width made these ships very clumsy at high speed. Despite the huge rudder area - the largest on US ships, to match the cruiser itself - ships of this type had practically no chance to evade a massive air raid from different directions, which, in particular, is confirmed by the fate of the deceased in 1942 Lexington. True, the possible need to evade such raids during the design of cruisers was not yet thought about.
Crew and Habitability
The crew of the battlecruiser according to the project consisted of 1297 sailors and officers (when the ship played the role of flagship, this number increased to 1326 people). The habitability of the ship had to correspond to that on the battleships of the US Navy, since the size of the battlecruisers allowed this. In this regard, the opinion of specialists from the Royal Navy of Great Britain is interesting, who, during the joint actions at the end of the First World War, thoroughly familiarized themselves with the battleships of the ally.
Officers' wardroom of the battleship "Pennsylvania"; the rooms on the battlecruisers of the Lexington type should have looked approximately the same
The British paid tribute to the excellent habitability of the ships and the attention that was paid to the convenience of the crew and the maintenance of mechanisms and equipment (they especially liked the electric bakery, the infirmary and the ship's store). The rooms and passageways on the American battleships were spacious and comfortable, well ventilated and heated; each crew member had a locker for personal belongings. Even junior officers (ensigns) were located in comfortable cabins in twos. The British especially noted comfortable cabins, cockpits and mess rooms, as well as very thoughtful layout, large and clean dining rooms, where tables and chairs were folded and pulled up to the ceiling when they were not needed.
Canteen of junior officers on the battleship "Oklahoma"
The British were greatly impressed by the presence on American ships of automatic machines for making hot coffee and ice cream. U.S. battleships had powerful desalination plants and a huge supply of fresh water for domestic use, so that sailors, as a rule, had no difficulty in drinking, as well as running baths and laundries. Although even here the British identified some shortcomings - for example, they did not approve of the combination of wash basins and latrines of the rank and file adopted by the Americans. British sailors especially noted the convenience of using a large number of electric drives on American battleships for a variety of purposes, as well as well-developed intra-ship communication systems.
Communications, detection, auxiliary equipment
For long-distance communications, the battlecruisers, according to the project, were to receive standard radio rooms with a single radio station. If they were completed as the ships served, they would undoubtedly receive both new radio stations and a complete set of radar equipment, which US battleships acquired on the eve and during World War II.
Fire control system of the main caliber on battle cruisers Lexington according to the project did not differ from their contemporary American battleships. It consisted of command and rangefinder posts (KDP) with 6-meter rangefinders, from which target data was sent to the central artillery post (DAC), which, in turn, issued guidance and firing commands to the calculations of the towers. On cruisers like Lexington the main KDP was located above the conning tower, another 6-meter rangefinder was supposed to stand on the roof of an elevated aft tower; periscopic rangefinders were also located in each of the GK towers.
A six-meter rangefinder on the roof of the tower of the battleship "New York", the same should have been on the tower of the "Lexington"
Since 1917, the Ford Mk.1 analog electromechanical computer was used to generate firing data on American battleships, at that time one of the most advanced devices of this kind. He took into account not only the range to the target, its heading angle and speed, but also the strength and direction of the wind, the influence of the Coriolis force, the state of his own ammunition, the degree of wear of the gun barrels, and much more. The Ford ballistic computer developed not only a solution for current position targets, but also calculated - based on changes in target data - where the target would be during the flight of the projectiles (in other words, calculated the preemptive firing point). Moreover, this "computer" could correct its decision based on data on the difference between the calculated and the real place where the shells fell.
Centralized anti-mine artillery fire control system it was absent on American battleships until 1918 (the guns of the anti-mine battery were guided individually, by their own calculations - using only general data about the enemy received from officers of the fire control groups). In 1917-1918, when getting acquainted with the setting of the case on British ships, this approach was recognized as obsolete. To eliminate the backlog, the Americans completely copied the British system, including the Vickers PMK fire control devices (in the USA, these devices received the designation Mk.7). Like all battleships under construction or undergoing repairs after 1918, battlecruisers of the type Lexington should have received 4 PMK fire control posts (2 on each side). All anti-mine guns had arrow indicators that were linked to the Vickers calculators in these posts; the arrows told the crews how to aim their guns based on the data of the calculators - while the gunners themselves might not even see the target.
For target designation at night battlecruisers were supposed to serve standard 914-mm combat searchlights.
As watercraft, as on all large ships of the US Navy, large (from 9 to 15 m long) motor boats with gasoline engines were supposed (after rebuilding into aircraft carriers, there were 11 such boats on the ships).
Armament
Main caliber
According to the 1916 project, the main caliber of the cruisers were ten 14-inch (356-mm) guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers - the same model as on the battleships of the type New Mexico. However, already in the 1917 project, they were replaced by much more powerful 406-mm guns. In the final form, the cruisers should have received 8 latest 406 mm Mark 2 guns with a barrel length of 50 calibers. Designed specifically for arming superdreadnoughts of the type South Dakota, they were supposed to surpass any artillery system ever put on a warship until then.
Indeed, if the 406-mm 45-caliber gun "Mark 1" on the battleship Colorado fired a 952-kg projectile with an initial speed of 792 m / s at a distance of up to 31 km, its English counterpart "16-inch naval gun Mk I" fired a 929-kg projectile at a speed of 788 m / s at 32 km, then 406-mm The 50-caliber "Mark 2" accelerated a heavier (1016 kg) projectile to an initial speed of 808 m / s, reaching a range of 41 km. The Japanese 410-mm / 45 gun, even despite a slightly larger caliber and almost the same (1000 kg) projectile, also fell short in terms of its capabilities to the new American gun, firing its projectile at a speed of 790 m / s at 38.4 km.
A prototype of the new gun was made and fired at the range in early April 1918, and until 1922 the long-barreled "sixteen-inch" even managed to be produced in 71 copies. However, with the cancellation of the construction of battleships of the type South Dakota and battlecruisers of the type Lexington The 406-mm / 50 American gun for the fleet remained in the category of experienced ones: they were transferred only to coastal defense, for installation on land.
20-meter barrels of colossal guns (about 130 tons each) were to be mounted in pairs in four linearly elevated towers of the cruiser. The towers were of standard design for the American Navy, so the assessment that British experts gave to the towers of US battleships at that time from their point of view is interesting. As they noted, unlike the English ones, the American main-caliber towers had a completely different layout; the systems for storing and supplying ammunition also differed. Some of the shells were stored directly in the fighting compartment of the tower - mainly in its rear part. The towers themselves, compared with the English ones, were more compact and had a simpler shape. Instead of hydraulic drives, American towers used electric ones, which saved weight. True, this savings was partly offset by an abundance of manual operations (for example, opening and closing gun locks was done manually) - which led to a significantly larger number of tower crews compared to British practice.
Auxiliary and anti-aircraft artillery
As in the case of the main caliber, anti-mine artillery battlecruisers was unified with that on battleships of the type South Dakota and consisted of sixteen 152-mm 53-caliber guns "Mark 13". On cruisers like Lexington 8 PMK guns were installed in casemates and 8 more - in open installations on the superstructure. The new gun surpassed the 127-mm guns installed as secondary armaments on all previous US battleships, more than twice in terms of projectile weight (48 kg versus 23 kg) and a good third in range (23 km versus 17 km), only slightly inferior in rate of fire (6-7 rounds per minute versus 8-9 for the 127mm gun). Thus, the anti-mine caliber (PMC) of the new battleships and battlecruisers should have become significantly more powerful than even on the US battleships under construction. Colorado- which reflected the progress in the size and combat capabilities of the destroyers with which this Secondary Armed Forces had to fight. When, according to the Washington Agreement, the completion of types was stopped Lexington and South Dakota, 152-mm / 53 guns "Mark 13" found application on light cruisers of the type Omaha as the main caliber.
As anti-aircraft artillery cruiser type Lexington were to carry four 76-mm / 23 Mark 11 guns: two on the roof of the superstructure and two more on the stern, immediately behind the forecastle. Loaded manually with unitary shots, these guns could fire 8-9 rounds per minute at a height of up to 5.5 km - this was considered enough against aircraft of the early 20s. If the battlecruisers were put into operation, then, according to the experience of the modernization of US battleships, their anti-aircraft weapons would be many times strengthened.
Torpedo armament
In accordance with the views of that time, torpedo tubes were considered quite appropriate even on the largest artillery ships. American battlecruisers were to receive their share of torpedo armament: 4 underwater 533-mm torpedo tubes looked forward (2 on each side of the stem), and 4 more torpedo tubes (two on each side) were planned to be installed above the waterline in the stern body parts. Torpedoes of the Bliss-Lewitt Mark 3 Model 1 system with a caliber of 533 mm were 5 m long, and out of a total weight of 934 kg, ninety-five kilograms accounted for the warhead. A torpedo of this type could go to the target at a distance of up to 8.2 km at a speed of 27 knots.
Aviation armament
According to the project, aircraft were not provided for on board the battlecruisers. However, based on the experience of the service of all American battleships, soon after construction, the cruisers would first receive platforms for taking off a reconnaissance aircraft, then a full-fledged powder catapult.
Overall evaluation of the project
Battle cruiser Lexington, drawing by L. Laernd
In general, battlecruisers of the type Lexington, although they were built on the other side of the ocean from England, in fact they were the embodiment of the views of the British admiral Fisher brought to the absolute - who above all in a warship put speed and firepower. In Great Britain itself, back in 1915, the project "Incomparable" (battle cruiser incomparable), which was remarkably similar in characteristics to Lexington: a long and narrow hull of almost the same (46,000 tons) displacement, the same 180 thousand horsepower and the same 35 knots of speed with the most powerful (on the "Incomparable" - from six 508-mm guns) weapons, but all this due to extremely weak booking. The British Admiralty showed enough prudence not to bring, though "incomparable", but highly unbalanced and expensive ships to the stage of construction - especially since the Battle of Jutland, which broke out soon, clearly showed the weakness of the defense of the previously built battlecruisers of the Royal Navy. The loss of three ships of this class in one battle at once, which forced Admiral Beatty to say in his hearts his famous “something is wrong with our damn battlecruisers!”, led to a serious revision of the armor protection on the cruisers under construction Repulse and complete reworking of the project of the future Hood. The resulting battlecruiser Hood became one of the most balanced and advanced ships of its time, combining high firepower and high speed with quite decent armor protection. The Japanese, creating their battlecruisers for the "8 + 8" program ( Amagi and subsequent) - also did not chase the record speed, limiting themselves to 30 knots, which made it possible to significantly surpass Lexington both in firepower (due to the “extra”, fifth main turret), and in armor protection.
Battle cruiser- a subclass of battleships with armament close to or equal to the battleship, but with a higher speed with weaker armor and sometimes with a lower displacement. They were intended primarily for combat with enemy cruisers: speed made it possible to catch up and impose battle on a cruiser (easily eluding slower battleships), and superiority in armament made it easy to defeat classic cruisers. Attempts to use a battlecruiser as a battleship in battle against "real" battleships, as a rule, led to defeat due to weaker armor than battleships. The armor of battlecruisers violated the rule of thumb suggested by English shipbuilders at the time that a ship must have sufficient armor to withstand its own guns. The British Admiral Sir John Fisher was the originator of the battlecruiser concept. Later, he brought his idea to the absolute, proposing the concept of a light battlecruiser - a ship of huge displacement with the most powerful artillery for that period and purely symbolic armor.
The first Invincible-class battlecruisers Invincible) (1908, 17,200 tons, 25 knots) were built in England.
In Germany, the first battlecruiser was the Von der Tann. Von der Tann) (1911, 19370 tons, 27.5 knots). At the same time, an interesting incident took place: the Blucher was supposed to become the first German battlecruiser, but the British misinformed the Germans about the ideas of the Fischer concept (allegedly the battlecruisers would be reduced copies of dreadnoughts with proportionally weakened weapons and armor), and they built the Blucher exactly as "reduced copy" of their battleships. As a result, when the real characteristics of the English battlecruisers became known, it became clear that the Blucher clearly did not correspond to them, and it was classified as an exception as a heavy cruiser.
As a result, in 1910-1915, two kind of "schools" of designing battlecruisers developed - the British one (Japanese battlecruisers also belonged to it), which relied on high speed, autonomy and salvo weight to the detriment of armor and survivability, and the German one, which put its goal is to create more balanced ships, although they do not differ in special power of fire or high autonomy.
| Comparative TTEs of the first dreadnought battleships and battlecruisers | ||||||
| "Dreadnought" | "Invincible" | "Nassau" | "Von der Tann" | |||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| State | ||||||
| ship class | battleship | battle cruiser | battleship | battle cruiser | ||
| Date of laying of the lead ship | 2 October | April 2 | July 22 | March, 25 | ||
| Date of commissioning of the lead ship | December | March | May 3 | February 20th | ||
| Full displacement, t | 21 845 | 20 078 | 21 000 | 21 700 | ||
| Length and width, m | 160.6x25 | 172.8x22.1 | 146.1x26.9 | 171.7x26.6 | ||
| Length to width ratio | 6,42 | 7,82 | 5,43 | 6,45 | ||
| Artillery of the main caliber | 10х305-mm/45 | 8х305-mm/45 | 12х280-mm/45 | 8х280-mm/45 | ||
| Side volley of main guns, guns | 8 | 6-8 | 8 | 8 | ||
| Mine caliber | 27х76 mm | 16х102-mm/45 | 12х150-mm/45 | 12х150-mm/45 | ||
| Side armor, mm | 102-280 | 102-152 | 80-300 | 80-250 | ||
| Deck armor, mm | 35-76 | 20-65 | 55 | 50 | ||
| Booking towers main battery, mm | 280 | 178 | 280 | 230 | ||
| armor weight, | 5000 | 3460 | 6685 | 6450 | ||
| Armor weight in % of normal displacement | 27,9 | 20,1 | 36 | 33,3 | ||
| Power plant | steam turbine, 23,000 hp | steam turbine, 41,000 hp | steam engines triple expansion 22,000 hp | steam turbine, 43,600 hp |
||
| Mass of the power plant, t | 2050 | 3390 | 1485 | ? | ||
| The mass of the power plant in% of the normal displacement | 11,5 | 19,7 | 8 | ? | ||
| Max Speed, nodes | 21 | 25,5 | 19,5 | 24,75 | ||
In Russia, battlecruisers of the Izmail type were built, the design of which was essentially revolutionary - these were the first high-speed battleships in the world with weapons that exceeded the armament of battleships of the Gangut type, the ships were called battlecruisers for political reasons (in order to pass a law on financing them buildings through the thought). The revolution prevented their completion, the Bolsheviks sold all the unfinished cruisers of this series to Germany, where, before dismantling for metal, German shipbuilders very carefully studied their design, who then applied many of the Russian innovations in the design of large ships of the Nazi fleet.
The construction of fast battleships negated the importance of battlecruisers after World War I, although some of the battlecruisers remained in service until the end of World War II. In the interwar period, the concept of a "big cruiser" became a logical continuation of the ideology of battlecruisers, which were designed and even tried to build by almost all the leading maritime powers (except England), but as a result, large cruisers appeared only in the US Navy.
The last battlecruisers, the design of which began at the final stage of the First World War, were never built or completed according to the original designs, only three of them - two American and one Japanese - entered service as aircraft carriers. At the same time, if the Japanese projects were essentially an exponential development of the ideas of the British school, then the Americans went their own, original path: the Lexington-class battlecruisers had powerful armament of 8 406-mm guns and high speed combined with very moderate armor protection. The tactical purpose of such ships remained unclear - they were too large and expensive to destroy light forces, and it was too risky for them to engage in battle with an equal enemy, however, in -1921, the Americans laid down 6 such ships at once. In this series, the English "G-3" was essentially not a battlecruiser, but a battlecruiser, further development type "Hood", Britain was going to abandon the construction of classic battlecruisers.
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Ships and battles
warships of the world
St. Petersburg 1998
On pages 1-4 of the cover are photographs of the battlecruisers: "Goeben" (1st - 3rd page) and "Seidlitz" (4th page)
Scientific - popular publication Muzhenikov Valery Borisovich "Battlecruisers of Germany"
Those. editor A. A. Bystrov
Lit. editor E. V. Vladimirova
Proofreader S. V. Subbotina
INTRODUCTION
In 1905, a professor at the Massachusetts School of Shipbuilding in the USA, V. Hovgard, formulated the tasks that an ideal "squadron cruiser" of the future should perform. They boiled down to the following: rapid concentration and coverage of the enemy's flanks; imposing a battle on the enemy and maintaining fire contact with him until the approach of the main forces; pursuit of a retreating enemy; reconnaissance in combat; independent long-range operations and support for light cruisers.
How did Hovgard picture the future ship? In essence, it should be a squadron battleship in terms of armament and armor, increased in size in order to develop a higher speed. Hovgard's insight must be given credit: the ships he predicted actually appeared ten years later. But in 1905, the British shipbuilders, who designed the "squadron cruiser" to match the "Dreadnought", were still disgusted by the idea that a cruiser could be larger than an armadillo. Therefore, they took the second path - to increase the speed not by increasing the displacement, as Hovgard suggested, but mainly by weakening the reservation. The Germans, who accepted the challenge of the British, chose the third path - being content with lower speed, they great attention paid to the armor and survivability of the ship.
According to the classification of 1911, squadron battleships began to be called battleships, and "squadron cruisers" - battlecruisers. According to the terminology that has become generally accepted, it can be said that on the first English battlecruisers, in which protection was sacrificed for speed and firepower, the emphasis was more on cruising functions than on squadron ones. In the very first German battlecruisers, squadron requirements prevailed over cruising ones. This difference was quite fully manifested in the course of the First World War. Nevertheless, neither the British nor the Germans managed to turn off the path outlined by Hovgard - the steady increase in displacement from series to series became the main road for the development of battlecruisers.
The term "battlecruiser" for the period 1905-1920 can be defined as the designation of a ship at least four knots faster than a contemporary battleship, armed with guns suitable for the main battery artillery of contemporary battleships, and with such armor protection as is possible under the two previous conditions. The difficulties in creating a satisfactory design for such a ship, which could have a displacement less than that of the corresponding battleships, or, with a few exceptions, would not be much more than theirs, consisted in the large size and weight of the boilers, machines and mechanisms necessary to provide higher speed.
The battlecruisers, probably, as it was imagined in England, were suitable both for normal cruising service and for use in battle as a fast division of the main forces. The second task immediately took precedence over the others.
The beginning of the first battlecruisers of the Invincible type was laid in 1906 by England. With the exception of Germany and Japan, the rest of the maritime powers, which until that time had built armored cruisers, not only did not continue their construction, but also generally refused to build heavy cruisers in the future. According to the concepts adopted in the German navy, heavy cruisers included armored and battleships. Such a heavy cruiser could be to some extent equivalent to a battleship not for its relatively weak armament, not for its rather weak armor protection, but for its higher speed. Of course, this could only be achieved by using a larger displacement.
As a result, a new type of strong and formidable ships appeared, in the creation of which Germany was always more successful than England.
Starting with the Von der Tann in Germany and the Lion in England, the battlecruiser was larger than the contemporary battleship. In this regard, it is necessary to point out a significant increase in displacement, which from year to year was characteristic of German armored and battlecruisers: York (laid down in 1903) - 9,533 tons, Scharnhorst (1904) - 11,616 tons , "Blucher" (1907) - 15,842 tons, "Von der Tann" (1908) - 19,370 tons, "Moltke" (1909) - 22,979 tons. Within six years, the displacement increased 2.4 times, only after that the growth significantly decreased.
The first ever British battlecruisers Invincible, Inflexible and Indomitable were launched in 1907. Yielding to the modern Dreadnought in displacement (17,250 tons versus 22,000 tons), they carried almost the same number of guns of the main caliber (eight versus ten) and developed a speed of 26 knots versus 22. The price of these advantages is easily revealed when comparing armor protection: where the Dreadnought had 279 mm armor, the Invincible had only 152 mm, which was significant less than the German battlecruisers.
Armored cruiser Scharnhorst.
The strengthening of the German navy during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II coincided with a time of intense technical development in shipbuilding. Of course, this process proceeded unevenly. Periods of some inertia gave way to sharp leaps forward. This allowed the Germans to create ships that, thanks to the introduction of the latest technology, stood out significantly among similar ships of other maritime powers.
In Germany, there was a clear line of development of armored cruisers, which began with Furst Bismarck (laid down in 1897, displacement 11461 tons), continued with Prince Heinrich (1900, 9806 tons), Prince Adalbert and Friedrich Karl "(respectively 1901 and 1902, 9875 tons), "Roon" and "York" (respectively 1903 and 1904, 10266 tons) and ended with "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" (1906, 12985 tons) - the famous ships of Admiral Count Spee.
The displacement of these cruisers steadily increased, their speed also increased from 18.7 to 23.5 knots. However, there was one reduction - the caliber of the main artillery, starting with the "Prince Adalbert" was reduced from 240 mm to 210 mm. This decrease was justified by the fact that the newly improved armor-piercing 210 mm projectile had the same damaging effect as the 240 mm one. The reduction in caliber led to the possibility of installing two turrets with two rapid-firing 210 mm guns instead of two single-gun turrets of 240 mm caliber, which significantly increased the combat capability of the ship compared to the Prince Heinrich (Fürst Bismarck had two turrets with two 240 mm guns) .
The medium-caliber artillery consisted of 12 150 mm rapid-fire guns on the Fürst Bismarck, compared to 10 on the other cruisers, each of which was mounted either in single-gun turrets aboard the ship over an armored belt, or in an armored citadel or casemates. Auxiliary artillery, originally consisting of 10 88mm rapid fire guns, was increased to 12 on the Prinz Adalbert and then to 18 on the Scharnhorst.
Briefly about the article: The history of battleships and battlecruisers - the most powerful combat vehicles ever created by man.
Twilight of the Giants
Battleships of the latest generation
A lifeless Concordian dreadnought sailed past us. The battleship got the first number, and it’s hard for me to imagine what else, besides the armor-piercing silumin shells of other battleships, is capable of disfiguring a mighty flying fortress in such a way.
Alexander Zorich "Tomorrow the war"
The largest warships have always been considered the beauty and pride of the state, the embodiment of the strength, wealth and technical excellence of the state. But prosperity and failure always go hand in hand. In the 30-40s of the 20th century, heavy artillery ships reached the limit of perfection. This means that they could no longer develop further, keeping up with the times. We present to your attention the story of the rise and fall of the most powerful fighting machines created by man.
"Treaty of the Five Powers"
In 1922, Great Britain, the USA, France, Japan and Italy concluded an agreement on the limitation of armaments at sea - the so-called "Washington Treaty".
Surprisingly, the main instigator of disarmament was England - the strongest maritime power, going according to the treaty for the greatest sacrifices. If other states parted with only a few obsolete ships and limited the construction of new ones, then the British “put under the knife” half of their battle fleet.
Past and future of the artillery ship.
The reasons for this "generosity" were, of course, predominantly economic. The war drained the resources of the kingdom. The British, in any case, were forced to make their "Great Fleet", where 400,000 sailors served, half as great.
Tactical considerations also played their part. At the beginning of the 20th century, England thoughtlessly built ships, trying to maintain a two-fold superiority over the Germans. The classic dreadnought had a speed of about 20 knots and was not suitable for active operations. For shelling coastal targets, monitors with a small draft were much better suited. The only purpose of the battleship was to fight with similar enemy ships. And if the enemy did not go out to battle, the ship became only a "finance destroyer".
The parade of "irons" of the English "Grand Fleet".
No one was particularly eager to fight, and for almost the entire war the English and German fleets stood at their bases. There was nothing to fight for: the German fleet from Hamburg could not threaten the communications of England; the British saw no reason to invade the North Sea.
running boar
Speed solved not only the problem of battleship mobility, but also significantly reduced its vulnerability. The flight time of the projectile at a distance of 20-25 km reaches 40 seconds. During this time, the battleship shifted by 2-3 hulls and, noticing the flash of an enemy salvo, could change course.
An increase in speed by one and a half times also reduced the number of enemy submarines that had time to intercept the ship. The accuracy of torpedo fire turned out to be much worse. Destroyers, whose speed was most often 35-37 knots at that time, could hardly be dangerous. In order to catch up with the fleeing giant, they needed to spend 2-3 hours in the range of its guns.
At a distance of 20-40 kilometers, even the colossus of a battleship turns into a small-sized moving target.
fast battleships
By the end of the war, it became clear that the battleship, with the previous level of armor and armament, should have a speed of at least 27 knots. More powerful machines would have increased the displacement of the ship to about 45,000 tons, but such giants would have required few. Faster ships are easier to transfer from one theater of operations to another. Instead of waiting years for a general battle with enemy battleships, a high-speed ship could participate in operations, escorting and supporting the cruisers.
But the Washington Treaty, among other things, forbade the construction of ships with a displacement of more than 35,000 tons. The high-speed battleship did not fit into this framework. As a result, in the 1920s and 1930s, the powers did not even use the established limit on the number and total displacement of battleships. The restrictions still did not allow the creation of a ship with the capabilities that corresponded to the requirements of the time. The effects of the Great Depression also affected.
Until the end of the 1930s, the British launched only Rodney and Nelson - ships of by no means outstanding qualities: well-armed (9 406-mm guns) and protected, but slow-moving. The Americans decided on 3 similar Maryland-class battleships. The Italians, French and Japanese did not build anything. The Germans were bound by the Versailles restrictions. And socialism was built in the USSR.
The situation revived only in the last pre-war years. As soon as there was a smell of gunpowder, the powers rushed to arm themselves, unanimously rejecting the Washington restrictions. But it was already too late. In total, only 23 high-speed battleships were built during the pre-war and war years.
Dry figures do not give a completely adequate idea of the combat capability of these ships. So, in terms of the ratio of protection, speed, armament and displacement, the Littorio look the most advantageous. But if Italian ship armor by that time was the best in the world, then the guns of this country were of very low quality.
"Rodney" (type "Nelson"). Member of the hunt for the Bismarck.
In one respect, it was the Italians who demonstrated the overwhelming advantage of the fast battleship over the conventional one. During the battle at Matapan, the Vittorio Veneto received a torpedo in the stern, lost half of the screws and settled into the water along the deck ... But even after that, the old English Valiant could not catch up with him.
On the other hand, formally unremarkable German battleships, due to their well-thought-out design, showed incredible survivability under enemy fire. The British planted about 40 shells with a caliber of 356-406 mm into the Bismarck. Moreover, the last shots were fired from a distance of only 2500 m. In addition, the battleship was hit by 4 torpedoes. But after the war, an examination of the hull lying at the bottom showed that the Bismarck sank as a result of the discovery by the crew of the kingstons.
Just as unpleasantly surprised the enemy and "Tirpitz". He remained afloat after the explosion of four 2-ton mines under the bottom, laid by saboteurs. The British managed to "get" it only with bombs weighing 5.5 tons. Tirpitz did not sink immediately, but after 3 direct and several close hits. By the way, "Roma" - the last of the three battleships of the "Littorio" type - disappeared under water after 2 hits with bombs weighing 1800 kg.
"Littorio". The Italians were better at building ships than at fighting on them.
If you ask yourself which of the projects was the best, then you have to admit that most types of high-speed battleships were approximately equal in strength. The European ones had better protection, the American ones had more powerful weapons. The Yamato and Iowa traditionally claim the title of the best ship in the class. Moreover, one can hardly doubt that the much more powerful Japanese battleship would easily have emerged victorious from the duel.
Gigantism did not make the Yamato a clumsy ugly creature like the German Maus supertank. Careful selection of the hull shape provided her with even better maneuverability than many other battleships, acceptable speed and the ability to operate in shallow water.
"Tirpitz". Dark community.
For their part, the Iowas had better balanced characteristics, and would have surpassed the Yamato in any combat mission (except, in fact, the battle with the Yamato). The speed of these ships is sometimes even indicated as 33 knots. The wave raised by the battleship going at full speed posed a serious threat to the destroyers accompanying it. But sometimes it was also saving: experienced captains specially sent their ships to it so that the water that swept the decks would put out the fires.
"Yamato" in battle.
By the beginning of World War II, the USSR had only three old battleships built back in the days of the empire. One of them was based in Sevastopol in order to neutralize the Turkish battlecruiser Yavuz (formerly the German Goeben) on occasion. The other two in the Baltic were preparing to join the salvos of their guns to the fire of the coastal batteries of Kronstadt. After all, the indicators of "Marat", "Paris Commune" and "October Revolution" looked modest even by the standards of the First World War. This state of affairs did not seem acceptable to the Soviet leadership. Adopted in 1938, the "Great Shipbuilding Program" provided for the construction of 15 giant battleships of the "Soviet Union" type. But by the summer of 1941, only 4 were laid down. The country's industry was not yet ready to produce either armor or vehicles for battleships. After the victory, the completion of the Soyuz did not resume. Both because of the devastation, and because it became known that at a significantly higher cost, Soviet battleships and battlecruisers would have been no better than the American Iows and Alaskas.
"Marat". Displacement 22,000 tons, speed 21 knots, 12 305 mm guns, 225 mm armour.
battlecruisers
Another option for a heavy artillery ship was the battlecruisers that appeared at the beginning of the 20th century. With the same displacement and armament as battleships, ships of this type had lighter armor, but increased speed to 25-29 knots. It was assumed that the combination of agility and weapons would allow the battlecruiser to participate in both raids and battles.
But in reality, for patrolling on communications, the battlecruisers turned out to be excessively armed. Guns with a caliber of 343-381 mm could only be needed to fight battleships. But with them, the cruiser was not allowed to engage in battle armor. Even in the battle of Tsushima, it was the battlecruiser Oslyabya that was the first to go to the bottom. In the Battle of Jutland, the British lost 3 battlecruisers, but not a single battleship. The Germans also lost an old battleship and a battlecruiser.
Nevertheless, after the First World War, it was the battlecruiser Hood, the largest and closest to the ideal of a “high-speed battleship” ship, that became the flagship of Her Majesty’s fleet. But the result of his meeting with a real high-speed battleship - the Bismarck - was quite predictable. After the second hit, Hood exploded. Whereas the battleship "Prince of Wales", even having received 5 shells from the "Bismarck", left the battle only due to a technical malfunction.
Battlecruisers of the Second World War: "Hood" and "Gneisenau".
The battlecruisers of the new generation were designed only for combat with other cruisers, which made it possible to reduce the caliber of the guns. By the beginning of the war, the French built Dunkirk and Strasbourg, while the Germans acquired Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. And if the French ships were distinguished primarily by the original placement of weapons (the main caliber in two 4-gun turrets at the bow, auxiliary guns at the stern), then the German version was distinguished by an absurdly powerful armor for a battlecruiser. Having limited themselves to protection only from the fire of 203-mm guns, the Germans would have received a truly ideal "killer of cruisers" with a speed of 34-35 knots.
The original characteristics of the Scharnhorsts were connected with the fact that, having freed themselves from Versailles (but not Washington!) Restrictions in 1935, the Germans tried to get both a full-fledged battleship and a raider at once. Moreover, keeping within the permitted 35,000 tons. Naturally, the result left much to be desired.
French battlecruiser Dunkirk.
Designed battlecruisers in other countries. But the American "Alaska" and "Guam" (undoubtedly the best ships in their class) appeared only towards the end of the war, and did not have time to take part in the hostilities. Two Soviet cruisers of the Kronstadt type were not completed.
"Pocket" battleships
The classification of the German ships of the Deutschland series is an old subject of dispute. Can they be considered battlecruisers?
In fact, there is nothing to argue about here. The Germans themselves used the definition of "panzership" only to circumvent the Versailles restrictions. After the start of the war, the Deutschlands were immediately assigned to the class of heavy cruisers, which both their displacement and armor clearly indicated belonging to.
The cruiser "Deutschland" ("Germany") was later renamed "Lützow". To reduce moral damage in case of sinking.
battleship vs aircraft carrier
In our time, it is often argued that by the beginning of World War II, the battleship was an obsolete type of ship. The outcome of battles was determined by aircraft carriers, because the most powerful guns hit a maximum of 40-45 km, and carrier-based aircraft are able to detect and attack the enemy at a distance of 300-400 km.
But the strategists of the 40s did not share this point of view, rightly believing that comparing a battleship with an aircraft carrier is just as ridiculous as with a submarine. No one disputed the advantages of naval aviation, but after all, on land, aircraft did not replace guns. Only in Japan, the production of battleships ceased in 43. In the United States and Great Britain, battleships were built until the end of the war.
Aircraft carriers aroused quite justified distrust among the admirals. After all, aviation is active only during the day and only in good weather. During the night, the fast battleship managed to strike and go beyond the reach of torpedo bombers. The best sailors - the British and Japanese - were preparing to fight at night. And preferably in heavy storm conditions. The exercises of the fleets of these nations were so extreme that they often led to the loss of ships. Down to the battleships.
The displacement of modern aircraft carriers exceeds 90,000 tons. The Yamato record has been broken.
But hard in teaching - easy in battle. At night, the Japanese used ordinary binoculars to detect American ships earlier than the Americans were able to notice the enemy with the help of radar. The British, on the other hand, conducted convoys through the Strait of Sicily in such weather when enemy destroyers sent to intercept disappeared in the waves, radioing: “We are sinking, long live Italy!”.
According to the pre-war ideas of the British, Japanese, German and American admirals, the aircraft carrier had to constantly accompany 2-3 battleships, carrying out reconnaissance and covering them from air attacks. Accordingly, he was forced to act regardless of the weather and approach the enemy at the same distance as his "wards". And this, in turn, required the ship to be equipped with powerful armor even to the detriment of the number of aircraft on board. The Japanese went the farthest, arming some of their aircraft carriers with 8-inch guns.
Aircraft carriers would have remained an auxiliary force in the battle fleet. But in 1941, Admiral Yamamoto made a revolutionary decision to apply them independently and massively. Only by choosing the time and place of the battle at its own discretion, naval aviation could fully use its advantages. Having lost battleships at Pearl Harbor, the Americans were forced to adhere to the same tactics. The British, on the other hand, remained unconvinced for a long time.
Admiral Yamamoto.
American aircraft sank the giant Yamato and Musashi, and this fact is often regarded as evidence of the superiority of aircraft carriers. Indeed, neither the most powerful anti-aircraft artillery (24 universal 127-mm guns and up to 150 25-mm machine guns) nor barrage salvos from 460-mm guns saved the battleships from the armada of bombers. But ... no aircraft carrier would have held out for so long against a quarter of the forces thrown at the Yamato. The only thing was that the battleship was still not designed for operations in conditions of complete domination of the enemy in the air.
Jean Bart, the last battleship built, was laid down before the war.
Universal caliber
In the 1930s, 12-20 universal guns with a caliber of 114-133 mm, intended for firing at both surface and air targets, became the standard armament of battleships. The exceptions were the German Scharnhorsts and Bismarcks. Their creators were so sure that a caliber of at least 150 mm was required to fight destroyers that they tried to put 6-inch guns even on their own destroyers.
Naturally, the battleship also received 12 of these guns. Another 14-16 anti-aircraft guns were intended to combat aircraft. As a result, the total weight of the salvo of auxiliary artillery in relation to the weight of the salvo of the main caliber was 26% for Scharnhorst, instead of 3-13% for "normal" battleships. Undoubtedly, the "standard set" of auxiliary artillery with less weight would have better protected the ship from attacks both from the sea and from the air.
The fire of anti-aircraft guns.
Postwar years
With the last salvos of World War II, the history of battleships basically ended. Although they were still under construction. In 1946, the British launched the Wangard, an unremarkable ship that differs from its counterparts of the King George type only in its speed increased to 30 knots and armed with eight 381-mm cannons taken from old dreadnoughts. The French, in 1950, completed the Jean Bart of the same type as Richelieu.
In the USSR, new battleship projects continued to be worked out until 53. But none of the plans was embodied in metal. As a result, the Novorossiysk, a captured Italian battlecruiser Giulio Cesare (Cavour type), born in 1914, remained the flagship of the Soviet fleet.
In 1955, in the harbor of Sevastopol, the Novorossiysk was destroyed by an underwater explosion of unknown origin. Such an explanation as "sabotage by foreign intelligence agencies" can apparently be dismissed from the threshold. For this ship no longer represented any combat (and even propaganda) value. In the very near future, like other battleships, it was expected to be scrapped.
"Novorossiysk" after the disaster.
By the end of the 50s, not only the old battleships, but also most of the new ones, had already undergone metal cutting. Only 4 "Iowa" Americans were sorry. They decided to conserve until the case. As a result, the eternal rest of these battleships turned out to be very restless. "Iowas" fought off the coast of Korea, then they were "awakened" during the Vietnam War. They then supported the landing of American troops in Lebanon. In 84, the battleships even decided to put them back into service "on a permanent basis", re-arming them with 32 Tomahawks. It was assumed that with the help of cruise missiles and guns they would be able to protect aircraft carriers and hit ground targets.
"Iowas" would still have served ... If the USSR had not collapsed.
In their latest "rebirth" "Iowa" combined artillery weapons with missiles.
It is worth mentioning another quality of the battleship, which in 1984 seemed to the Americans an important advantage. A battleship looks more impressive than an aircraft carrier and, unlike it, can get close enough to a hostile coast that the natives can see the US military presence with the naked eye.
Space Force Battleship.
Is that why battleships do not let go of the human imagination and still remain the flagships of space squadrons in science fiction novels and electronic games?
Izmail-class battlecruisers- type of Russian battle cruisers of the first quarter of the 20th century.
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✪ The Russian Imperial Navy on the eve of World War I
Subtitles
History of creation
Battlecruisers were to be used as part of a high-speed detachment of the main forces in squadron combat. They were assigned the role of a freely maneuvering force capable of carrying out deep tactical reconnaissance and covering the head of the enemy squadron. By decree of October 23, 1907, the Council of Ministers put into effect the “Regulations on the composition and division of the fleet”, according to which the “operationally capable squadron” of the Russian fleet was to consist of eight battleships, four armored ships, nine light cruisers and 36 destroyers. The task of creating such a squadron was put forward as a priority in the draft “Programs for the Development of the Russian Naval Armed Forces for 1909-1919” developed by the Naval General Staff.
356 mm turret mounts
In the tenth years of the 20th century, an increase in the main caliber became the main argument of artillery in the confrontation between "armor and projectile." In England, Japan, America, ships with a caliber of guns of 343 mm, 356 mm, 381 mm and more begin to appear. In October 1911, the Naval Ministry organized a competition for turret mount projects, it was assumed that each of the future cruisers would be armed with four 356-mm three-gun turret mounts, with a rate of fire of three volleys per minute, without taking into account aiming. Five factories took part in the competition: three St. Petersburg - Metallic, Obukhov and Putilovsky, as well as the Society of Nikolaev Plants and Shipyards (ONZiV) and the English Vickers plant. The competition was won by the Metal Plant with a project developed by the famous engineer A. G. Dukelsky. The mechanical part of the turret mounts was developed on the basis of 305-mm turret mounts for battleships of the "Sevastopol" type, to reduce weight, the gun was first installed without the so-called "shirt", directly in the cage. Nevertheless, the weight of the gun compared to the 305 mm increased from 50.7 to 83.8 tons. To increase the speed of overrun, the overrun regulator and overrun buffer were used. The roof of the tower was assembled from 125 mm armor plates, the walls of the tower from sheets 300 mm thick.
Construction history
On October 12, 1912, the ships ordered by the Baltic Shipyard were named Izmail and Kinburn, and the Admiralteysky - Borodino and Navarin. On December 6, after the ceremonial laying, the cruisers were officially enrolled in the lists of the fleet, although the theoretical drawing of their hull had not yet been finally approved.
Design
In terms of armament, the Izmail-class battlecruisers were significantly superior to their contemporary dreadnoughts and superdreadnoughts. Most foreign battleships and battlecruisers were inferior to them in terms of the number, caliber and weight of a side salvo, up to the "Washington" battleships of the type Rodney. The only weapons rivals for the Izmails were American "standard" battleships. In terms of protection, the Izmails were inferior to most of their contemporary battleships - their armor made its way at most combat distances already with 305-mm shells. Due to superiority in speed and weapons, they could only count on success in a fleeting battle or on a timely withdrawal. Comparison of the Izmails with the battlecruisers of other countries, especially with the British, makes no sense at all - such is the superiority of the Russian cruisers in armament.
In August 1913, the results of full-scale tests were obtained, obtained during the execution of the “excluded ship No. 4” (the former battleship Chesma), on which elements of the armor protection of the new battleships were mounted, and these results plunged the shipbuilders into a state of shock. It turned out that the armor belt was pierced by 305-mm projectiles at distances of 85-90 cables - individual plates were pressed in, and the outer side "broke" even in cases where the armor plates did not break through; the flooring of the upper deck was destroyed, and its fragments - and the middle one. On the Izmails already under construction, they had to limit themselves to improving the systems for attaching armor plates, strengthening the set behind the armor, introducing a 3-inch wooden lining under the belt, and changing the weight of horizontal armor on the upper and middle decks.
By August 1914, the readiness for the weight of the hull installed and being processed was 43% for Izmail, 38% for Kinburn, 30% for Borodin and 20% for Navarin. The pace of construction lagged behind the approved schedules due to delays in the supply of materials and castings. Already on May 22, 1914, the dates of the launch of the first two ships were postponed to October of the same year. With the outbreak of war, there was a disruption in the supply of main battery turrets. Part of the castings and forgings, mortars and propeller shaft brackets, manufactured in Germany, had to be ordered from the already overloaded factories of the Naval Department. According to the new time sheets approved on December 20, the launch of the first two cruisers was postponed to May, the second to September 1915, and the readiness for testing was postponed to May and August 1917, respectively, that is, with a year's delay against the planned dates.
On the morning of June 9, 1915, the lead ship of the series, Izmail, was launched. On June 11, Borodino was launched, and on October 17, Kinburn. In accordance with the new classification announced by the Maritime Department on June 27, ships of the Izmail type were enrolled in the class of battlecruisers.
After launching three ships into the water construction works almost completely stopped. Only in the spring of 1916, all pre-launch work on the Navarin was urgently completed, and on October 27, 1916, the cruiser launched.
As of April 15, 1917, the readiness of the cruisers Izmail, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin was as follows: for the hull, systems and devices - 65, 57, 52 and 50%; for already installed waist and deck armor - 36, 13, 5, 2%; mechanisms - 66, 40, 22, 26.5%, for boilers - 66, 38.4, 7.2 and 2.5%. The completion date of the Izmail towers was postponed to the end of 1919, and the rest of the ships - to next year. In the summer of 1917, the congress of shipyard workers, who decided to continue building the Izmail, if only for the sake of earning money, expressed a desire to convert the rest of the ships of this type into commercial ships. In the draft studies, two options for conversion were outlined: into cargo (or oil-loading) steamships with a carrying capacity of 16,000 tons each and into oil barges (22,000 tons).
At the end of 1917, the Provisional Government decided to suspend the construction of a number of ships, including the Izmail series. During the years of the Civil War, the hulls of battlecruisers remained at the walls of the factories. On July 19, 1923, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin were excluded from the lists of the fleet, and on August 21, the ships were acquired "in their entirety" by the German company Alfred Kubats. On September 26, tugs arrived in Petrograd for the Kinburn, and later for the other two. Boilers, mechanisms and other ship equipment were used in the national economy, partly in the repair and modernization of warships remaining in service.
Several options for completing the Izmail were put forward, including conversion into an aircraft carrier. This project originated in March 1925. It was supposed to equip the ship with powerful artillery weapons and an air group consisting of 12 torpedo bombers, 27 fighters, 6 reconnaissance aircraft, 5 artillery markers. Estimated displacement was 20,000-22,000 tons. The project was approved by the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars A. I. Rykov